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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter by virtue
of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp.
1988), having previously issued a Writ of Certiorari to review
the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in Svayne v. L.D.S.
Social Services, 761 P.2d 932 (Utah App. 1988).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

DOES UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987)
VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION?

2.

DOES UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987)
VIOLATE ART. I, § 24 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH?

3.

DOES APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) TO THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS
GUARANTEES OF THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS?

4.

DID THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT ERROR BY REFUSING TO
CONSIDER THE APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-12
(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE?
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987);

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-12 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987);

3.

Constitution of Utah, Art. I, § 24;

4.

Constitution of Utah, Art. I, § 7;

5.

Constitution of Utah, Art. IV, § 1;

6.

United States Constitution, Amend. XIV;

7.

United States Constitution, Amend. V.
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T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906
(Utah App. 1988)

17,43,44,45,46

Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah,
681 P.2d 197 (Utah 1984)

7,12,15,24,28, &
31,39

Wilson v. Family Services Division,
554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976)

35

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9
1987)

1,2,6,7,16,17, &
18,32,46

1,4,5,24,27, &
29,31,34,38,42,44,47
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6,16,17,42, &
43,45,46

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
E. Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed
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45 Ohio State L. Rev. 313, 367 (1984) . . . .

36,37

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and for a declaration that Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4
(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) is unconstitutional, either on its face or as
applied to the facts of this case.

The action was initially

filed in United States District Court for the District of
Utah.

The Federal Court, Hon. J. Thomas Greene, found

jurisdiction over the claim but elected to abstain in deference
to state court consideration.

See Swayne v. L.D.S. Social

Services, 670 F.Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1987).
This action was then filed in Third District Court
where the Hon. Homer Wilkinson denied plaintiff's motion for a
preliminary injunction and granted summary judgment for
defendants.

The Court of Appeals denied plaintiff's motion for

injunction pending appeal, expedited briefing and argument, and
entered its decision affirming the trial court's judgment.
Steven Swayne is the father of a child born to Penny
Paxman on June 4, 1987. Mr. Swayne acknowledged his paternity
prior to the child's birth and his family held a baby shower
for the mother.

Steven was present in the delivery room when

the baby was born and visited with her each day she was in the
hospital.

After the mother and child were discharged from the

hospital on June 6, they visited with Mr. Swayne at his
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apartment on June 8 and June 9 (R. at 203, Vol. I of Transcript
at 8, 10-11, 15).
On June 8, Ms. Paxman, at the urging of her parents,
met with a counselor for L.D.S. Social Services to discuss
possible adoption.

Her parents wanted the child placed for

adoption because Mr. Swayne is black and Ms. Paxman is white.
Penny never told Steven she was thinking of placing the child
for adoption, though in March of 1987 she had said her parents
wanted her to give up the baby.

Steven informed her at that

time that if she did not want custody of the child she should
give the baby to him.

On June 8, Penny elected to give up the

child because her parents told her that if she kept the baby
she could have no further contact with her family (R. at 203,
Vol. I of Trans, at 10, 13-14, 37).
Despite her execution of a release of the child, Penny
was allowed to retain physical custody of the baby on June 8.
She was told to sign the release on June 8 "so Steven wouldn't
have an opportunity to file his paternity."

(R. at 203,

Vol. II of Trans, at 7-8). She took the child to Mr. Swayne's
home on the 9th for a visit.

She did not disclose the proposed

adoption but instead told Steven she and the baby were going to
take a trip to California.

That afternoon she surrendered

physical custody of the child to L.D.S. Social Services and she
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went to California.

She repeatedly called Mr. Swayne from

California and pretended she had the baby with her.

On

Saturday, June 13, she told Steven's family the baby had died.
Mr. Swayne discovered that this was a lie and persuaded
Ms. Paxman to return to Utah to assist him in regaining custody
of his daughter.

Mr. Swayne filed an acknowledgment of

paternity on Monday, the 15th of June, and he and Ms. Paxman
attempted to have the child's birth certificate amended to give
the child Mr. Swayne's family name.

They went to L.D.S. Social

Services to request that Steven be given the child but were
informed that it was too late and Mr. Swayne should seek legal
counsel (R. at 203, Vol. I of Trans, at 15-19).
Steven Swayne was not aware of his obligation to file
a notice of paternity to protect his legal rights until he
spoke with a lawyer on June 13, 1988 (R. at 204, Vol. II of
Trans, at 11-12).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987)

operates so as to deny plaintiff equal protection of the law in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.

This violation arises from the different

treatment accorded to mothers and fathers of illegitimate
children under the statute, which requires the consent of the
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mother before any adoption can occur but does not require that
of the father.

Where the identity and location of the father

are known, the statute's gender-based distinction between the
father and mother cannot be found to be substantially related
to the achievement of an important governmental objective and,
therefore, is violative of equal protection.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987)

denies plaintiff the uniform protection of the law guaranteed
by Article I, § 24 of the Constitution of Utah by authorizing a
gender distinction in the rights it purports to accord parents
of an illegitimate child.

As gender classifications are

expressly prohibited by Article IV, § 1 of the Utah
Constitution, the strictest scrutiny must be applied to any
statutory distinction in the treatment of men and women.

There

is no compelling state interest which justifies the statute's
sexual discrimination nor any legitimate state purpose which is
served by the statute's gender distinction.
3.

As applied to the facts of this case, Utah

Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) operates so as to deny
plaintiff due process of law in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution.

This result occurs

because Mr. Swayne was irrebuttably presumed, under the terms
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of the statute, to have abandoned his daughter by virtue of his
failure to file an acknowledgment of paternity prior to the
time that she was surrendered for adoption by her mother, even
though Mr. Swayne had in fact not abandoned the child, was
unaware of any obligation on his part to file the
acknowledgment to preserve his parental rights and was not
informed of any intent on the part of the mother to place the
child for adoption.

Under the circumstances of this case,

termination of Mr. Swayne's parental rights would be
inconsistent with any notion of fundamental fairness.
4.

Mr. Swayne alleged and demonstrated that he did

all that was necessary to adopt his daughter by acknowledgment
under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-12 (Rep.Vol. 9
1987).

Accordingly, he was the father of a legitimate child

and could not, constitutionally, be required to file a notice
of paternity or suffer forfeiture of his parental rights.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
UTAH'S ADOPTION STATUTES ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) contains an
express gender-based discrimination.

The statute provides that

a woman who is the parent of an illegitimate child must consent
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to the adoption of her child while a male parent of an
illegitimate child is given no equivalent right unless he files
an acknowledgment of paternity with the Department of Health.
Given the statute's undeniable gender-based
discrimination in treatment of men and women, the statute is
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution unless it can be
established that the discrimination is substantially related to
the achievement of an important governmental objective which is
served by drawing the distinction.

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.

190, 197 (1976).
The sex discrimination embodied in Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-30-4 does not advance the governmental objective which has
been repeatedly articulated as the statute's purpose.

The

state interest embodied in that statute is the
strong interest in speedily identifying
those persons who will assume the parental
role over [illegitimate] children, not just
to assure immediate and continued physical
care but also to facilitate early and
uninterrupted bonding of the child to its
parents. The state must therefore have
legal means to ascertain within a very short
time of birth whether the biological parents
(or either of them) are going to assert
their constitutional rights and fulfill
their corresponding responsibilities, or
whether adoptive parents must be substituted.
Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 197, 203
(Utah 1984) .
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While there can be little question that this statement
sets forth a valid state objective, equal protection analysis
requires a determination of whether the statutory
classification scheme employed provides a reasonable basis for
promoting this objective.

Although the statute provides a

method of identifying some fathers who are willing to fulfill
their parental responsibilities, it in fact defeats its stated
objective by not requiring any mother to take any action to
identify herself as a willing parent.

This case graphically

illustrates how the statute can, in certain circumstances,
frustrate the state's purpose.
Mr. Swayne, who has expressed his willingness to
fulfill his responsibilities, was not "identified" as a willing
parent because the statutory method of identification, filing a
notice with the registrar of vital statistics, is itself an
"unreasonable" method of identifying willing fathers.

Reason

would suggest that such fathers can be identified by examining
their relationship with their child.

Ms. Paxman, the child's

mother, was inaccurately "identified" as a willing parent
simply because of her sex.

Therefore, while the statute

automatically gave her the rights of a responsible parent, it
did so in spite of the fact that she was not.
A statutory provision which operates to differentiate
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between men and women in a manner which takes parental rights
away from responsible fathers while fully vesting such rights
in irresponsible mothers cannot be found to provide a
reasonable means of speedily identifying willing parents.
Accordingly, the classification employed violates the
principles of equal protection.

As stated by this Court in

Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984):
[i]f the relationship of the classification
to the statutory objective is unreasonable
or fanciful, the discrimination is
unreasonable.
693 P.2d at 671.
The defendants in this action have not, and cannot,
offer any explanation of how the gender-based discrimination in
the statute promotes the legitimate state interest of speedily
identifying willing parents.

There simply is none.

While it has been asserted that the state has a
special interest in speedily establishing the intentions of the
father of an illegitimate child, it can't be denied that it has
an equal interest in speedily establishing those of the
mother.
goal.

Yet, the statute does nothing to facilitate this

Because the statute often only comes into play when the

mother is expressly abdicating her parental responsibilities,
the focus of judicial analysis is frequently upon the state's
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interest in speedily determining if the child can be made
available for adoption.

This raises the question of how the

state may deal with the parental rights of a father whose
identity and location may be unknown.

While it must be

acknowledged that the state can legitimately enact measures
designed to require such fathers to come forward or suffer
termination of their parental rights, the state may not use the
problems presented by absent fathers to discriminate against
identified, present and willing fathers of illegitimate
children.

To do so violates the second portion of the equal

protection guarantee, that "persons in different circumstances
should not be treated as if their circumstances were the
same."

Malan v. Lewis, supra at 669. Accordingly, while

potential problems associated with the rights of fathers of
illegitimate children may make such fathers an appropriate
class for distinct legislative treatment, the members of that
class whose circumstances present none of the problems which
the statute was designed to meet cannot, constitutionally, be
treated as though they did.

In short, a statute designed to

provide a means for terminating the parental rights of
unidentified or unwilling fathers should have no application to
a known and willing father.
It must be borne in mind that it is only a legitimate
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state objective which can justify a legislative
classification.

Therefore, the fact that the statute in

question functions in a manner which facilitates the adoption
process, by removing potential obstacles in the adoption of
illegitimate children by strangers, is no defense to an attack
on its constitutionality because the state has no valid
interest in terminating the parental rights of a willing and
responsible father whose child happens to be illegitimate.

See

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
The irrationality of the discrimination employed by
our statute is graphically demonstrated by reference to the
facts of this case.

On June 8, when the mother, father and

infant child were all together in the father's apartment, the
mother's parental rights were fully vested and the father's
were not.

Had the mother left the child with Steven and gone

to California he could not have effected a termination of her
parental rights by surrendering the child to L.D.S. Social
Services.

However, on the next day, when they were again all

together at Steven's apartment, the mother had already
extinguished Steven's rights by signing her consent form.
Before she left for California, leaving behind her natural
daughter, Ms. Paxman had been able to terminate Steven's rights
even though he was willing to stay and care for the child.
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In Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, supra,
this Court suggested there are reasonable bases for the
statute's classifications (between unwed mothers and fathers
and between fathers who file and those who do not), yet neither
in that opinion nor any other has any court been able to
articulate any such basis.

What must ultimately be recognized

is that Utah's adoption law attempts to deal with the problems
of unknown fathers with far too broad of a brush.

It accords

mothers with too much protection, it accords fathers who file
their notice with too much protection and it leaves the rights
of some fit and willing fathers totally at the mercy of the
mother.

It is improper to vest such power in the mother alone.
The actions of both parents after the birth
of their child determine their ability to
accept parental responsibility. An unwed
mother may have no more desire to conceive
or knowledge of the conception than the
unwed father. Nevertheless she is given a
choice to keep or relinquish the child
because she gave birth. Her decision to
release the child for adoption should not
deprive the father of a meaningful
opportunity to retain and develop his
relationship.

In re Baby Girl M, 688 P.2d 918, 925 (Cal. 1984).
The simple fact is that under the Utah statutory
scheme an indifferent and unfit mother has the absolute right
to prevent the adoption of her child until her parental rights
have been terminated by judicial decree, while a caring and
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father who is willing to establish a true parental relationship
can see his rights totally forfeited by virtue of his failure
to comply with an unknown filing requirement.

There is no

rational justification for this disparity of treatment between
men and women and it serves no governmental interest to
discriminate against interested fathers and in favor of
disinterested mothers.
Such a statutory scheme was condemned by the United
States Supreme Court in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979).

In that action the Court struck down a New York

statute which purported to require an unwed mother to consent
to an adoption of her child but imposed no such requirement of
receiving the consent of an unwed father.

The Court expressly

noted that any attempt to justify such a discrimination by
virtue of the fact that unwed fathers often cannot be located
or identified or that they often do not accept their parental
obligations has to be rejected in a case where the father is
known and willing to act as a father.
In those cases where the father never has
come forward to participate in the rearing
of the child, nothing in the Equal
Protection Clause precludes the State from
withholding from him the privilege of
vetoing the adoption of that child. Indeed,
under the statute as it now stands the
surrogate may proceed in the absence of
consent when the parent whose consent
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otherwise would be required never has come
forward or has abandoned the child. But in
cases such as this, where the father has
established a substantial relationship with
the child and has admitted his paternity, a
State should have no difficulty in
identifying the father even of children born
out of wedlock. Thus, no showing has been
made that the different treatment afforded
unmarried mothers under § 111 bears a
substantial relationship in the proclaimed
interest of the State in promoting the
adoption of illegitimate children.
In sum, we believe that § 111 is
another example of "overbroad generalizations" in gender-based classifications. The
effect of New York's classification is to
discriminate against unwed fathers even
where their identify is known and they have
manifested a significant paternal interest
in the child. The facts of this case
illustrate the harshness of classifying
unwed fathers as being invariably less
qualified and entitled than mothers to
exercise a concerned judgment as to the fate
of their children. Section 111 both excludes
some loving fathers from full participation
in the decision whether their children will
be adopted and, at the same time, enables
some alienated mothers arbitrarily to cut
off the paternal rights of fathers. We
conclude that this undifferentiated
distinction between unwed mothers and unwed
fathers, applicable in all circumstances
where adoption of a child of theirs is at
issue, does not bear a substantial relationship to the State's asserted interests.
441 U.S. at 392-93.
Every argument advanced as a justification for
treating unwed fathers differently from unwed mothers is
premised upon the potential differences between how they may
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deal with the child.

However, these justifications are

entirely absent when an unwed father has publicly acknowledged
his child and expressed the desire to support the child both
financially and emotionally.

When the purported rationale for

the differing statutory treatment of men and women is absent,
the statutory discrimination cannot be constitutionally
applied.

As the Court noted in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248

(1983), "these statutes may not constitutionally be applied in
that class of cases where the mother and father are in fact
similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the
child."

463 U.S. at 267.
The history of the litigation surrounding this statute

demonstrates by itself the irrationality of the statutory
discrimination.

In this case, in Wells, supra, in Sanchez v.

L.D.S. Social Services, 680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984), in Ellis v.
Social Services Dept. of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1986), and in In re
Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986), courts have
been confronted with actions by fathers who have asserted their
desire to have custody of their children but have had to do so
against the factual background that a woman automatically
identified by the statute as a "willing" parent whose sole
consent for adoption is required, had expressly disavowed her

-15-

willingness to function as a parent.
What must be acknowledged is that the real purpose of
the statute is not speedy identification of willing parents but
rather speedy identification of that class of people who the
law requires to disavow their willingness to act as parents
prior to any adoption.
is wholly impermissible.

Drawing this line on the basis of sex
Nor is it reasonable to say that the

statutory distinction is based on the mother's automatic
identification as a biological parent by virtue of the birth
process, because if the statute's true aim is merely one of
speedily identifying the biological parents it could not
operate to exclude those fathers, like Mr. Swayne, who were
clearly known and identified at the time and place of their
child's birth.
Plaintiff acknowledges that this Court rejected an
Equal Protection argument in Ellis, supra.

Plaintiff

respectfully submits, however, that Ellis was wrongfully
decided and should be disavowed.
In Ellis, this Court found that § 78-30-4 didn't
violate equal protection principles because a different
statute, § 78-30-12, permitted a father to "adopt by
acknowledgment."
two reasons.

This provision doesn't save the statute for

First, it imposes on a father certain
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requirements that are not imposed on the mother before his
parental rights are recognized.

This is nothing more than a

second statutory "undifferentiated distinction" between men and
women.

There is no rational justification for requiring a

father to "adopt" his own child.

If the statute requires the

father to do more than merely identify himself as such, then it
imposes a burden on a man which is not imposed on a woman.
Second, the Court itself expressly held in Ellis that
whenever the natural mother relinquishes
custody of the child either to an agency or
to an individual for purposes of adoption,
in order to protect his rights under U.C.A.
1953, 78-30-12, the putative father must
file a notice of paternity with the Bureau.
Where he fails timely to act, he "shall be
barred from thereafter bringing or
maintaining any action to establish his
paternity of the child."
615 P.2d at 1254 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, § 78-30-12 offers no protection to
fathers who don't file even if they have or are trying to
develop a substantial relationship with their children.

The

Court of Appeals has recognized that such an interpretation of
§ 78-30-4 would render it unconstitutional and, therefore, has
"modified" this Court's decision in Ellis by disregarding the
express statement that a putative father must file a notice to
preserve his parental rights.

See In re T.R.F., 760 P.2d 906

(Utah App. 1988) .
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Even if the Court of Appeals' interpretation is
adopted by this Court, the additional burden placed upon men
under the Adoption by Acknowledgement statute cannot be
justified because there is no statutory requirement that women
have any "substantial relationship" with their children before
their parental rights are fully vested.
Plaintiff readily concedes that a father's failure
over time to come forward and establish a relationship with his
child can fully justify a differing treatment between such a
defaulting father and the mother who retains custody of a
child.

However, there is no constitutionally permissible basis

for giving all women full parental rights at the moment of
birth, solely on the basis of their biological relationship
with their children, and conditioning the father's right upon
filing a statement of his willingness to serve as a true parent
in the future, a filing requirement of which the father may be
wholly unaware.
The Court of Appeals held in this case that the
statute wasn't a violation of equal protection because
if shown to be an unfit or indifferent
parent on account of cruelty, neglect, or
desertion of the child, a mother may have
her parental rights judicially terminated
and the child put up for adoption without
her consent pursuant to section 78-30-4(1).
Her parental rights will be terminated if
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she is shown to be unwilling to fulfill her
parental responsibilities.
Swayne, 761 P.2d at 938.
This statement actually highlights the statutory
discrimination between men and women by noting that a mother's
rights can only be forfeited by the State upon proof of her
unfitness, while a father's can be forfeited despite his
fitness and without even providing him a forum in which to
present proof.
It is disingenuous to suggest that the statute
contains no discrimination on the basis of sex.

Fathers and

mothers are accorded different rights under the literal terms
of the statute and the issue is whether these differences can
be justified on the basis of their rational relationship to a
compelling State interest.

If such a rational relationship

cannot be articulated, it should be apparent that it doesn't
exist.
It is respectfully submitted that the inability of any
party or court to ever state why identified and willing fathers
of illegitimate children are accorded different legal rights
than mothers of such children should provide a precise focus
for analysis of the equal protection question.

If the basis of

the gender distinction is, in reality, only the unspoken
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generalization that mothers are inherently more likely to care
about the welfare of their children than fathers, then the time
has come to acknowledge that this type of generalization, no
matter how strongly it might be believed to be correct as a
statistical matter, cannot properly form the basis for
distinctions in treatment of the fundamental rights of men and
women.

The core concept of equal protection of the law, as it

pertains to gender discrimination, is that legal rights cannot
be granted or denied on the basis of historically honored
stereotypes about the differences between men and women.

When

the defendants seek to justify the statute's discrimination
because of the "profound" (but unidentified) differences
between mothers and fathers, they are doing no more than
invoking the very prejudices which constitutional guarantees of
equal protection under the law are designed to protect
against.

The only real justification offered for Utah's

statutory discrimination is the unstated but implicit argument
that women inherently and inevitably care more for babies than
men and are therefore entitled to greater legal protection in
their relationship with their children.

If this argument was

made explicitly it could be seen to be the most blatant of
generalizations, unworthy of judicial validation.

Yet it is,

in reality, the only possible justification for the statute's
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distinction between the rights of the unwed parents when the
father is known and identified.
POINT II.
UTAH'S CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS GENDER
DISCRIMINATION IN THE GRANT OR DENIAL OF
CIVIL RIGHTS
Like the United States Constitution, the Utah
Constitution also prohibits enforcement of statutes which treat
individuals who are similarly situated in a different fashion.
As expressed by this Court,
[ajlthough their language is dissimilar,
these provisions embody the same general
principles: persons similarly situated
should be treated similarly, and persons in
different circumstances should not be treated
as if their circumstances were the same.
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d at 669.
Under Utah's Constitution, however, the equal
protection principles embodied in Art. I, § 24, require the
utmost scrutiny when analyzing a discrimination predicated on
gender.

This is true because our Constitution expressly

defines gender as an inherently suspect classification.
Art. IV, § 1 of the Constitution of Utah guarantees that men
and women shall enjoy equally "all civil, political and
religious rights and privileges."

Of course, parental rights

are "fundamental to our society."

In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364,

1375 (Utah 1982) .
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Given our state's express mandate that civil rights be
shared equally between the sexes, only a compelling state
interest could justify a statutory distinction drawn between
men and women.

Nowhere in this action have the defendants or

any court been able to identify any rational, let alone
compelling, justification for the difference in the statute's
treatment of unwed fathers and mothers.

The only justification

the defendants have ever asserted is that in the case of
newborns the law has long recognized that mothers are better
custodians than fathers.

This Court repudiated that

presumption, both as a matter of constitutional law and as a
matter of fact, in Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986).
It was noted that the presumption was not only unconstitutional,
it was simply wrong.
Even ignoring the constitutional
infirmities of the maternal preference, the
rule lacks validity because it is unnecessary
and perpetuates outdated stereotypes.
728 P.2d at 120.
Once this fiction is abandoned, it is transparent that
the only real difference between unwed mothers and identified
unwed fathers is their sex.

In holding that its state's

adoption statute was unconstitutionally discriminatory under
state constitutional law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted
that once freed from the historical prejudices which previously
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denied unwed fathers any parental rights, an analysis of
adoption statutes which treat unwed fathers and mothers
differently leads to the inescapable conclusion that such
statutes violate equal protection.
The only differences between unwed fathers
and unwed mothers are those based on sex.
This is an impermissible basis for denying
unwed fathers rights [under an adoption
statute].
Adoption of Walker, 360 A.2d 603, 606 (Pa. 1976).
The real, but often unspoken, impediment to
intellectually honest analysis of Utah's adoption statute is
the belief that treating men and women equally would be
contrary to the best interest of many children whose fathers
could thereafter irrationally and irresponsibly refuse to
permit adoptions from which their children might well benefit.
Even if this is true, it can't be denied that mothers have this
right under the statute as written.

To deny men the same

rights as women is constitutionally prohibited.

The fact that

to do so may be believed to be in some children's best interest
is simply an inadequate response to an equal protection
challenge because the best interests of the child is not, by
itself, a permissible basis for terminating parental rights.
In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982).

-23-

POINT III.
AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987)
VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS GUARANTEES OF BOTH
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Although this Court has previously found the
provisions of the statute to be facially valid under the Due
Process clauses of both the Utah and United States
Constitutions, it has recognized that application of the
statute can violate those provisions under particular
circumstances.

See, e.g., Wells v. Children's Aid Society of

Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984); In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe,
717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986).

Indeed, a recent decision of a

different panel of the Court of Appeals demonstrates that
application of the statute to a father who has promptly
asserted his parental rights when given a reasonable
opportunity to do so would never be consistent with the
principles of due process.
In In the Matter of K.B.E., 740 P.2d 292 (Utah App.
1987), the Court held that considerations of due process
prohibited application of the parental rights "forfeiture''
provisions of § 78-30-4(3)(c) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) to a father who
filed his acknowledgment of paternity the very day that he
learned the mother of his child had petitioned the Court to
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permit the child to be adopted by another man.

In affirming

the District Court's order dismissing the adoption petition,
the Court of Appeals noted that the father had failed to file
his acknowledgment of paternity within the time prescribed by
the statute but held that this failure did not preclude further
analysis of the facts to determine if due process required that
he be treated as though he had complied.
[A]lthough we have found that respondent
failed to timely file, we must also examine
whether the statute was constitutionally
applied to respondent. The state's interest,
as represented in the statute, is to allow
for early adoption of illegitimate children
and commencement of the bonding process
between the child and its new adoptive
parents. Such interest must be balanced
against the constitutionally protected right
of an unwed father to maintain and develop a
parental relationship. In Utah, the Supreme
Court has declared that under the Utah
Constitution the parental interest is a
"fundamental" right to be invaded only to the
extent necessary to promote a "compelling"
state interest.
740 P.2d at 296.
After noting the short delay involved in the father's
filing, the Court concluded that
[amplication of the statute to invalidate
respondent's acknowledgement of paternity
would impermissibly violate respondent's
constitutional rights under both the Utah
and United States Constitutions.
740 P.2d at 297.
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This holding is consistent with this Court's position
as expressed in In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686
(Utah 1986), wherein it was stated that
where a father does not know of the need to
protect his rights, there is no "reasonable
opportunity" to assert or protect parental
rights. In such a case, the operation of
the statute fails to achieve the desired
balance and raises serious due process
concerns.
717 P.2d at 691.
In that case, the father filed his acknowledgment of
paternity two days after the mother surrendered the child for
adoption, but one day after he learned of the proposed
adoption.

This Court concluded that his filing must be given

effect because he had shown
that the termination of the parental rights
was contrary to basic notions of due process,
and that he came forward within a reasonable
time after the baby's birth, [such that] he
should be deemed to have complied with the
statute.
717 P.2d at 691.
In this action, Mr. Swayne filed his acknowledgment on
the first day it was possible to do so after learning that his
child had been surrendered for adoption by her mother.

He had

received no prior notice of the mother's intent to take this
action, despite having been with the mother and child each day
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but one of the child's life prior to her release by the
mother.

Under the facts of this case it cannot be said that

Mr. Swayne was provided a "reasonable opportunity" to assert
his rights in a manner consistent with the demands of due
process.

Accordingly, the purported waiver of his rights set

forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3)(c) cannot be
constitutionally applied in this case and he should be found by
this Court to have all the rights and duties of a natural
father who has acknowledged paternity, including the right to
custody of his infant daughter.
The reason that the statute cannot be applied
constitutionally in this case is very simple:

the statute does

not provide an unwed father with adequate protection to insure
that he has a reasonable opportunity to develop his
constitutionally protected relationship with his child.

This

so-called "opportunity interest" of an unwed father is one
expressly recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), and one which was recently
defined by the Georgia Supreme Court in In re Baby Girl Eason,
358 S.E.2d 459 (Ga. 1987).

The Georgia Court noted that

it is an interest which an unwed father has
a right to pursue through his commitment to
becoming a father in a true relational sense
as well as in a biological sense. Absent
abandonment of his interest, a state may not
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deny a biological father a reasonable
opportunity to establish a relationship with
his child.
358 S.E.2d at 462.
The Georgia Court also noted that absent a
demonstration of unfitness, a
biological father who pursues his interest
in order to obtain full custody of his child
must be allowed to prevail over strangers to
the child who seek to adopt.
358 S.E.2d at 463.
The defendants cannot seriously contend that
Mr. Swayne in fact abandoned his opportunity interest in his
baby daughter in the four days following her birth because he
manifestly did not.
and his own home.

He visited her daily, both in the hospital

He invited his family to meet and visit with

his daughter and he openly and publicly acknowledged his
paternity.
There is no question that the natural father of a
child has a constitutionally protected interest in his parental
rights relative to his newborn child.

See Wells v. Children's

Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984).

This Court has

held that parental rights are fundamental, and as such, can
only be terminated to the extent necessary to further a

-28-

compelling state interest.

In In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah

1982), this Court concluded that
the right of a parent not to be deprived of
parental rights without a showing of unfitness, abandonment or substantial neglect is
so fundamental to our society and so basic
to our constitutional order that it ranks
among those rights referred to in Article I
§ 25 of the Utah Constitution and the Ninth
Amendment of the United States Constitution
as being retained by the people.
648 P.2d at 1375.
While this Court has noted that parental rights cannot
be constitutionally terminated except upon a judicial finding
of parental unfitness or abandonment, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) purports to mandate such a
finding in all cases where the father of an illegitimate child
hasn't filed an acknowledgment of paternity before his child is
placed for adoption.

The statute creates an irrebuttable

presumption that a father who files "untimely" has abandoned
his child.

This is the exact form of constitutional infirmity

in a statute which was condemned by the United States Supreme
Court in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), where it was
held that an Illinois statute which conclusively presumed
fathers of illegitimate children to be unfit parents violated
due process.

In that case, the Court noted that Illinois

insists on presuming rather than proving
Stanley's unfitness solely because it is
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more convenient to presume than prove.
Under the Due Process Clause that advantage
is insufficient to justify refusing a father
a hearing when the issue at stake is the
dismemberment of his family.
405 U.S. at 658.
The Utah statute purports to presume abandonment,
rather than prove it, by virtue of an omission in filing a
document.

It does not provide for any examination of the

actual relationship of the father with the child.

This fact is

dramatically demonstrated in this action because it is
undisputed that the plaintiff had no intent to and did not
abandon his child.

His failure to file a document of which he

was unaware prior to the happening of an event he had no reason
to anticipate simply cannot be viewed as conclusive evidence of
his intent to abandon the child.
This Court has held that parental rights may be
terminated for abandonment only "when the evidence is clear and
convincing."
1981).

McKinstray v. McKinstray, 628 P.2d 1286 (Utah

Abandonment occurs where
the parent has either expressed an
intention, or do conducted himself as to
clearly indicate an intention, to relinquish
parental rights and reject his parental
responsibilities to his child.

628 P.2d at 1288.

-30-

In In re J, Children, 664 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1983), this
Court defined abandonment as consisting of
conduct on the part of the parent which
implies a conscious disregard of the
obligations owed by a parent to the child,
leading to the destruction of the parentchild relationship.
664 P.2d at 1159.

The Court also noted that the proof required

to demonstrate abandonment was the same in an adoption case as
in a termination proceeding.

In light of these holdings, it is

remarkable that § 78-30-4(3) purports not only to remove any
burden of proving abandonment but to affirmatively preclude all
evidence demonstrating a lack of abandonment.
The effect of the statute is to deny an unwed father
substantive due process by denying him any opportunity to
contest the presumption of abandonment.

"Substantive due

process concerns the content of the rules specifying when a
right can be lost or impaired."

Wells, supra, at 204.

While much of the litigation surrounding § 78-30-4(3)
has focused on the lack of notice accorded unwed fathers, that
deficiency is of little constitutional significance under
Utah's statutory scheme for two reasons.

First, even if the

statute provided for notice of the adoption to be given to all
fathers and allowed them a hearing, the scope of such a hearing
would be limited to determining whether or not he filed a timely
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acknowledgment.

This is a finding that already occurs even in

his absence and his presence would not materially assist in
making that determination.
Second, there is no question that an absolute right to
notice of a proceeding wherein parental rights may be
terminated is not constitutionally required.

If it were, the

most unfit parents could frustrate all efforts to terminate
their rights by abandoning their children and keeping their
whereabouts a secret.

Accordingly, § 78-30-4 is not facially

invalid merely because it doesn't require notice to a putative
father as a condition of adoption.
The due process deficiency with the statute is that it
operates to terminate a father's rights as a parent before any
adjudication of his abandonment occurs and precludes him from
ever contesting the "finding" of abandonment.
As the Supreme Court noted in Stanley, an irrebuttable
presumption of this nature violates due process if the fact
presumed is not the necessary result of the fact determined.
In Stanley, the Supreme Court struck down the Illinois statute
which purported to equate a father's status as unmarried with
the fact of unfitness.
It may be, as the State insists, that most
unmarried fathers are unsuitable and
neglectful parents. It may also be that
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Stanley is such a parent and that his
children should be placed in other hands.
But all unmarried fathers are not in this
category; some are wholly suited to have
custody of their children. This much the
State readily concedes, and nothing in this
record indicates that Stanley is or has been
a neglectful father who has not cared for
his children. Given the opportunity to make
his case, Stanley may have been seen to be
deserving of custody of his offspring. Had
this been so, the State's statutory policy
would have been furthered by leaving custody
to him.
405 U.S. at 654-55.
The Court expressly rejected the notion that the
State's asserted need for expeditious determinations regarding
the child custody could override a parent's constitutionally
protected interest in relation to his children.
The establishment of prompt efficacious
procedures to achieve legitimate state ends
is a proper state interest worthy of
cognizance in constitutional adjudication.
But the Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency. . .
Procedure by presumption is always
cheaper and easier than individualized
determination. But when, as here, the
procedure forecloses the determinative
issues of competence and care, when it
explicitly disdains present realities in
deference to past formalities, it needlessly
risks running roughshod over the important
interests of both parent and child. It
therefore cannot stand.
405 U.S. at 656-57.
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This holding is equally applicable to the present
action where the statute irrebuttably presumes abandonment when
that finding would be impossible to make on the real evidence.
While it has been repeatedly noted that the State of
Utah has a strong and legitimate interest in identifying and
placing for adoption those children who are without parents
willing to provide for them, the State has no interest in
depriving children of their natural father who is willing to
fulfill his paternal duties.

As expressed by the Court in

Stanley, the state's legitimate interest can be disserved if a
statute operates in such a manner as to define certain children
as needing adoption when they do not.
[W]e are here not to evaluate the legitimacy
of state ends, rather, to determine whether
the means used to achieve those ends are
constitutionally defensible. What is the
state interest in separating children from
fathers without a hearing designed to
determine whether the father is unfit in a
particular case? We observe that the State
registers no gain when it separates children
from the custody of fit parents. Indeed, if
[the unwed father] is a fit father, the
State spites its own articulated goals when
it needlessly separates him from his family.
405 U.S. at 652-53.
The due process violation contained in § 78-30-4(3) is
not its lack of required notice but rather the refusal to allow
a meaningful hearing to a father who i_s aware of the adoption
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proceeding.

Utah law recognizes that the right to notice and

the right to be heard are not co-extensive.

For example, in

adoption proceedings a natural grandparent has a right to be
heard even though he has no right to notice of the proceeding.
See Wilson v. Family Services Division, 554 P.2d 227 (Utah
1976).
It is the statute's attempt to preclude a father from
establishing his willingness to fulfill his parental duties,
not its failure to inform him that his rights are under attack,
which violates due process.

This is true because a father who

has, or is attempting to establish, a true parental
relationship with his child is bound to discover that his
parental rights are being questioned or that another man is
asserting an entitlement to those rights.

The issue in this

case is whether it is constitutional to preclude a father from
proving that his child is not in need of adoption.
The inherent constitutional defect in Utah's statute
is that it does not provide adequate protection for the
"opportunity" of a biological father, which can be lost
immediately upon birth of the child, not only without notice
but without any judicial recourse to assert his entitlement and
to petition for time to take advantage of this valuable
opportunity.
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While Lehr v. Robertson, supra, holds that an unwed
father can lose this opportunity by the passage of a
significant period of time wherein he doesn't take advantage of
his protected status, the Court did not hold or suggest that
this opportunity could be lost in a matter of days, and lost
months prior to the time when a petition to adopt the child can
even be granted.
It should also be noted that Lehr was a step-parent
adoption case where the father's rights were terminated only
because of a finding that the child's best interest would be
served by allowing her step-father to acquire parental rights.
It has been suggested that the holding in Lehr in no way
applies to cases involving adoptions by strangers.
The time limitation [in which an unmarried
father must assert his rights] per se applies
only when another man has independently taken
on the responsibilities of fatherhood for
the child and asks the state to validate an
already existing relationship. If the
mother of the child consents to the child's
adoption by strangers, the state still is
required under the principles of Stanley,
unaltered by the Lehr opinion, to notify and
allow participation by a natural fatheriwho,
like Lehr, has done nothing to evidence
officially a waiver or loss of his interest
in the child. Failure to attempt to notify
a father in this circumstance under a scheme
like New York's should be unconstitutional
even after Lehr.
Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and
After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 Ohio State L. Rev. 313, 367 (1984).
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In short, Lehr is not persuasive authority for
upholding Utah's unique statutory scheme because it deals with
a wholly different statute which allows adequate protection of
an unwed father's "opportunity" interest in establishing a
parental relationship with his child.

Utah's scheme fails to

reasonably protect this interest and, as such, is violative of
the most basic notion of fundamental fairness.
It must be emphasized that the issue in this case is
whether Utah's statute provided Mr. Swayne with adequate
safeguards for his constitutionally protected "opportunity
interest" in establishing a true parental relationship with his
baby girl.

This analysis must be made without consideration

being given to the perceived interests of the proposed adoptive
parents, of L.D.S. Social Services, or even of the child
herself.

As noted in Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of

Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 Ohio State
L. Rev. 313, 373 (1984), where a biological father who asserts
his rights promptly is seeking to block a proposed adoption by
"strangers, the father's opportunity to establish a protected
relationship must prevail in the absence of his unfitness."
This Court has held that consideration of a child's
best interests cannot alone provide the basis for termination
of parental rights.

In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982).
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The question presented in this case, as in all cases of
termination of a parent's rights, should be whether
Mr. Swayne's actions warrant a finding of unfitness,
substantial neglect or abandonment.

However, because the

provisions of § 78-30-4(3) foreclose actual consideration of
this question, the statute burdens fundamental constitutional
rights without providing any opportunity for an unwed father to
establish his fitness or rebut the presumption of abandonment.
The absurdity of the statute's conclusive presumption
of abandonment is highlighted by the facts of this case.

On

June 9, 1987, when Mr. Swayne was visiting with his own
daughter in his own home he had already been "deemed" to have
abandoned his baby, an infant less than a week old with whom he
had spent a part of every day of her life save one.

A statute

which can operate to create an abandonment where none exists is
not consistent with the notions of basic fairness which lie at
the heart of the concept of due process, and cannot be given
effect in the circumstances present in this action.
The Court of Appeals avoided this argument by holding
that the "statute cannot create an irrebuttable presumption of
abandonment when parental rights do not exist."
940.

761 P.2d at

This holding, which takes as its premise the lack of any

parental rights of a natural father until he files a notice of
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paternity, is manifestly erroneous.

As this Court stated in

Wells, supra, the "relationship between parent and child is
protected by the federal and state constitutions.

These

protections include the father of an illegitimate child."

681

P.2d at 202. As this Court further noted in Wells, there are
three ways in which the parental rights of a father can be
lost.

They can be voluntarily surrendered, they can be lost

through abandonment or they can be terminated for unfitness or
substantial neglect.

Id. at 202-03.

Recognition that a natural father of a newborn
illegitimate child has constitutionally protected rights, be
they characterized as "inchoate" or "provisional" or as an
"opportunity interest," requires analysis of the statute's
method of protecting those rights from arbitrary forfeiture.
This is where Utah's adoption law runs afoul of the most basic
notions of fairness.

A statute which mandates a finding that a

father has abandoned an infant child with whom he has had as
substantial contact as the child's infancy permits, and of whom
he was actively seeking custody before the baby was two weeks
old, is an archetype of arbitrary legislation.
In Wells, this Court emphasized that the State had a
compelling interest in a "summary determination" of whether a
child is in need of adoption.

Assuming this to be true, can it
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honestly be said that the State's interest in a summary
determination outweighs its own interest in an accurate
determination?

The statute's constitutional deficiency isn't

so much a product of the speed with which a determination is
made as it is the basis upon which it is made.

Using the

filing of a document as the sole test for the determination of
a father's willingness and intent to form a true parental
relationship with his child, as opposed to examining the facts
of his relationship with the child, is illogical.

It is a

system which is destined to produce speedy determinations which
are frequently inaccurate.

Given the fundamental rights which

are being determined, a system which isn't even intended to
make a factually correct determination about a child's need for
adoption is so inherently arbitrary that it cannot withstand
appropriate constitutional scrutiny.
The Court of Appeals' failure to recognize that a
natural father has constitutionally protected rights in his
relationship with his child can, to some degree, be explained
by language of this Court in the Sanchez decision which was
quoted below.

This Court stated in Sanchez that Utah's law was

not too harsh in requiring unwed fathers "to comply with those
statutes that accord them the opportunity to assert their
parental rights. . ."

680 P.2d at 756.
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It is respectfully

submitted that this statement reflects the inaccurate notion
that a natural father's rights are created by the statute and,
therefore, limited by its terms.

The father's rights stem from

his biological relationship with his child and the Constitution
protects those rights from arbitrary attack by the State.

No

matter how strongly the State may desire to make a speedy and
summary determination of a father's rights, the guarantee of
due process is a bar to any State action which is so summary as
to preclude all consideration of a father's true willingness
and competence to function as a parent.
Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of
Rights in general, and the Due Process
Clause in particular, that they were
designed to protect the fragile values of a
vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing
concern for efficiency and efficacy that may
characterize praiseworthy government
officials no less, and perhaps more, than
mediocre ones.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 656.
The properly framed issue, therefore, is not whether a
father has asserted his rights in the manner provided by the
State, but whether the State has adequately protected the
father's inherent and fundamental right to exercise his
constitutionally guaranteed opportunity to form a true parental
relationship with his daughter.

Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.

248, 249 (1983).
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In Utah, where a father's opportunity can be lost
within hours of his child's birth and on the basis of an
irrebuttable presumption of fact which may well be untrue, how
can it honestly be said that his fundamental right has been
accorded adequate protection?

Under the facts of this case,

where Mr. Swayne sought custody of his baby daughter before she
was two weeks old, can it truly be said that his
constitutionally protected opportunity to form a true parental
relationship was adequately protected by Utah's statutory
scheme?

Plaintiff respectfully submits that the answer is no

and that answer demands a finding by this Court that due
process mandates that he be accorded such an opportunity.
POINT IV
AS STEVEN SWAYNE ADOPTED HIS DAUGHTER BY
ACKNOWLEDGMENT, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4(3)
CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR TERMINATION OF HIS
PARENTAL RIGHTS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-12 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) provides
that the father of an illegitimate child can legitimate the
child "from the time of its birth" by publicly acknowledging
his paternity and receiving the child into his family.

Steven

Swayne has satisfied these statutory requirements for his
daughter and had done so prior to her relinquishment by her
natural mother.

Accordingly, the provisions of Utah Code. Ann.

§ 78-30-4(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1987) should not be applicable to
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Mr. Swayne because he is not the father of an illegitimate
child.
Both in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals
Steven Swayne asserted that he did all that was required to
adopt his daughter by acknowledgment.

He openly acknowledged

his paternity, was present at birth, visited her in the
hospital, took the child into his home and family and treated
her in all ways as his legitimate offspring.

Thus, as a

different panel of the Court of Appeals held in T.R.F. v.
Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 910 (Utah App. 1988), "any filing of a
petition for adoption after an unwed father has met the
statutory requirement, and with only the mother's consent, is a
legal nullity."

The trial court made no finding on this issue,

however, because Mr. Swayne didn't file an acknowledgment of
paternity before relinquishment, and, as this Court held,
unequivocally, in Ellis v. Social Services Dept. of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980),
"in order to protect his rights under U.C.A., 1953, § 78-30-12,
the putative father must file a notice of paternity with the
Bureau."

615 P.2d at 1254 (emphasis added).

Obviously, the

"rights" referred to could only require protection if the
statutory requirements had already been met, otherwise there
would be no "rights" to protect under the statute.
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T.R.F. rejected this holding, however, because it was
felt that to actually apply the requirement of filing a notice
would be unconstitutional.
The language of Ellis need not be read, and
indeed cannot constitutionally be read, to
require a putative father to file a notice
of paternity prior to the filing of the
petition for adoption in a case such as this
when the putative father has previously
acknowledged the child within the meaning of
the acknowledgement statute.
760 P.2d at 911.

Therefore, in T.R.F., another panel of the

Court of Appeals noted the very problem in the Ellis reasoning
which Mr. Swayne has presented throughout this case and simply
chose to MmodifyM that portion of the opinion which expressly
required the filing of a notice of paternity before
relinquishment in every case where the father of the
illegitimate child sought to protect his parental rights.
Under the law as announced in T.R.F., before the defendants in
this case would have been entitled to summary judgment in the
trial court, they would have had to establish that Mr. Swayne
had not adopted his daughter by acknowledgment.

If he had,

then T.R.F. expressly holds just what Mr. Swayne has asserted
continuously in this case, that it would be constitutionally
impermissible to apply the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-30-4(3) to him.
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In Swayne, the Court of Appeals stated if Man unwed
father establishes a substantial relationship over a number of
years" he is protected by § 78-30-12. However, the statute
requires no such duration for the relationship (which it would
be manifestly impossible to have with a five-day-old child).
It only requires "(1) public acknowledgement by the father,
(2) receipt of the child into the father's family, and (3)
treatment of the child as legitimate."

T.R.F., supra, at 909.

That panel of the Court acknowledged that this statute, and
others like it, have always been given liberal construction and
only require public acknowledgment by the father to his family
and friends that the child is his, coupled with visits with the
child in his home or wherever the child resides, no matter how
brief.

The uncontradicted evidence in this case demonstrated

that Mr. Swayne publicly acknowledged his paternity both before
and after the child's birth.
baby shower for the mother.

He informed his family who held a
He was present at the birth of the

child in the delivery room where he claimed paternity.

He

visited the child every day it was in the hospital and also in
his own home.

He expressed willingness to take the child if

the mother chose to relinquish custody.

Whether a court finds

his actions toward the child's mother laudable or not is
irrelevant.

The judgment entered below cannot be sustained
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consistently with the law as announced in T.R.F., nor can the
statute be applied constitutionally if the holding of T.R.F. is
not adopted by this Court.
In order for the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-30-12 to provide a means for avoiding the sex
discrimination inherent in § 78-30-4, that statute must be
interpreted to only require an unwed father to identify himself
as such and have some minimal contact with the child which
establishes his intent to treat the baby as a member of his own
family.

To require more would be to impose a burden upon the

man not imposed upon the woman and would be inconsistent with
the equal protection principles cited above.

If this is the

interpretation favored by this Court, so as to save the
adoption statutes from an Equal Protection challenge, then
Mr. Swayne should either be found as a matter of law to have
adopted his daughter by acknowledgment or this matter should be
remanded to the trial court for entry of findings on that issue
with appropriate guidelines for what must be established to
demonstrate adoption by acknowledgment.
CONCLUSION
Utah's adoption statutes treat the rights of mothers
and fathers of unwed children differently.

They do so

regardless of the actual situation of the father and without
offering him any forum in which to establish his intent and
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willingness to form a true parental relationship with his
child.

The statutory scheme, therefore, deprives an identified

and willing father of fundamental rights without according him
equal protection of the law or due process.

The only manner in

which the statute can be saved from these twin infirmities is
if the adoption by acknowledgment provisions of the statute are
interpreted in such a flexible manner that any unwed father who
publicly identifies himself as such and expresses an intent to
develop a true parental relationship with his child is deemed
to be the father of a legitimate child with parental rights
which can only be terminated by proof of his unfitness or
neglect, or of his abandonment of those rights.
The appropriate relief in this action, therefore, is
either a declaration that Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3) is
unconstitutional, on its face or as applied to the facts of
this case, or a reversal of the judgment entered below for
failure to recognize plaintiff's rights under the adoption by
acknowledgment statute.
DATED this

day of March, 1989.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

By
M. David Eckersley
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that, on the

day of March, 1989,

I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF PETITIONER to the following:
David McConkie
Merrill F. Nelson
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Respondents

0236d
032889

-48-

ADDENDUM
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987);

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-12 (Rep.Vol. 9 1987);

3.

Constitution of Utah, Art. I, § 24;

4.

Constitution of Utah, Art. I, § 7;

5.

Constitution of Utah, Art. IV, § 1;

6.

United States Constitution, Amend. XIV;

7.

United States Constitution, Amend. V.

8.

Court of Appeals Decision in Swayne v. L.D.S.
Social Services, 761 P.2d 932 (Utah App. 1988).

9.

Decision of Hon. J. Thomas Greene in Swayne v.
L.D.S. Social Services, 670 F.Supp. 1537 (D. Utah
1987).

10.

Decision of Utah Court of Appeals in a related
action, In re T.R.F., 760 P.2d 906 (Utah App.
1988).

78*30-4. Consent to adoption — Paternity claims.
(1) A child cannot be adopted without the consent of each living parent
having rights in relation to said child, except that consent is not necessary
from a father or mother who has been judicially deprived of the custody of the
child on account of cruehy, neglect or desertion; provided, that the district
court may order the adoption of any child, without notice to or consent in court
of the parent or parents thereof, whenever it shall appear that the parent or
parents whose consent would otherwise be required have theretofore, in writing, acknowledged before any officer authorized to take acknowledgments,
released his or her or their control or custody of such child to any agency
licensed to receive children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8a, Title
55, and such agency consents, in writing, to such adoption or whenever it
shall appear that the parent or parents whose consent would otherwise be
required have theretofore, in writing, released his or her or their control,
custody, and e!l parental rights and interests in such child to any agency
licensed or authorized by statute to receive children for placement or adoption
in any state pursuant to that state's laws and said agency has m turn, in
writing, released its control and custody of such child to any agency licensed
under Chapter 8a, Title 55, or to any person, or persons, selected by that
agency licensed under Utah law, as adoptive parents for said child, and such
Utah agency consents, in writing, to such adoption.
(2) A minor parent shall have the power to consent to the adoption of such
parent's child, and a minor parent shall have the pov,er to release such parent's control or custody of such parent's child to any agency licensed to receive
children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8 [Chapter 8a], Title 55,
and, such a consent or release so executed shall be valid and have the same
force and effect as a consent or release executed by an adult parent A minor
parent, having so executed a release or consent, cannot revoke the same upon
such parent's attaining the age of majority.
(3^ (a) A person who is the father or claims to be the father of an illegitimate child may claim rights pertaining to his paternity of the child by
registering with the registrar of vital statistics m the department of
health, a notice of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate child and of his
willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability. The
department of health shall provide forms for the purpose of registering
the notices, and the forms shall be made available through the department and in the office of the county clerk in every county m this state,
(b; The notice may be registered prior to the birth of the chile but must
be registered prior to the date the illegitimate child is relinquished or
placed with an agency licensed tc provide adoption services or pnor to the
filing of a petition by a person with whom the mother has placed the child
for adoption Tne notice shall be signed by the registrant and shall include his name and address, the name and last known address of the
mother, and either the birthdate of the child or the probable month and
year of the expected birth of the child The department of health shall
maintain a confidential registry for this purpose.
(c) Any father of such child who fails to file and register his notice of
claim to paternity and his agreement to support the child shall be barred
from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to establish his paternity of the child Such failure shall further constitute an abandonment of
said child and a waiver and surrender of any right to notice of or to a
hearing m any judicial proceeding for the adoption of said child, and the
consent of such father to the adoption of such child shall not be required.
(d) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to an illegitimate child, if
there is no showing that the father has consented to the proposed adoption, it shall be necessary to file with the court pnor to the granting of a
decree allowing the adoption a certificate from the department of health,
signed by the state registrar of vital statistics which certificate shall state
that a diligent search has been made of the registry of notices from fathers of illegitimate children and that no registration has been found
pertaining to the father of the illegitimate child in question.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual sen-ice in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
thall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any Sute deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

CONSTITUTION OT UTAH

ART. I, § 7
No person shall be deprived
nf i;f« i;i •
Pm d
process of law.
° ° f I l f e ' l l l * * y or property without due

ART. I, § 24

All laws of a general nature shall hnvc uniform operation.

ART. TV, § 1
The rights of eitixens of the State of Utah to vote and hold office
•hall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. Both male and
female citizens of this Bute shall enjoy equally all civil, political and
religious right* and privileges.
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Steven H. SWAYNE, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
UD.S- SOCIAL SERVICES, John Doe
and Jane Doe, Defendants and
Respondents.
No. 880177-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Sept 15, 1988.
Unwed father brought suit against
adoption agency to obtain custody of child
which unwed mother gave up for adoption.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Homer F. Wilkinson, J., dismissed father's
action, and father appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Garff, J., held that (1) private
adoption agency was engaged in state action upon terminating father's parental
rights when filing adoption petition; (2)
requiring unwed father to file acknowledgment of paternity to preclude adoption of
child, but not requiring mother to file acknowledgment, did not violate equal protection of the laws; and (3) denial of parental
rights to unwed father who did not file
acknowledgment of paternity was not violation of father's due process rights.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part
1. Constitutional Law <8=»225.1, 274(5)
Infants <$=»155
"State action" was involved when private adoption agency placed child for adoption, so as to make Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees of due process and equal protection applicable to deprivation of alleged
father's parental rights, where State was
responsible for statute which deprives
unwed fathers of parental rights after
adoption, and where statute involved is
self-operative and mandates termination of
unwed father's parental rights upon agency filing adoption petition. U.C.A.1953,7830-4; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

2. Adoption «=>2
Constitutional Law «=>225.1
Statute which gives unwed father
right to consent to child's adoption only if
he files acknowledgment of paternity indicating willingness and intent to support
child does not discriminate on basis of gender and violate equal protection clause as
statute also states that mother may have
parental rights judicially terminated and
child put up for adoption without her consent if she is unfit or indifferent parent
U.CJU953, 78-3<M, 78-30-4(1); U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 14.
3. Infante <*=»155, 156, 157
Mother may have her parental rights
judicially terminated and child put up for
adoption without her consent if shown to
be unfit or indifferent parent on account of
cruelty, neglect, or desertion of child. U.C.
A.1953, 78-30-4(1).
4. Adoption e=>2
Constitutional Law €=»225»1
Statute which allows unwed father to
acknowledge paternity of child is not made
illusory by statute which states that father
loses parental rights upon adoption if no
acknowledgment has been made, as father
has right to make acknowledgment prior to
adoption; and thus there is no denial of
equal protection in allowing adoption without consent of father who has not filed
acknowledgment
U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4,
7&-30-12; U.S.OA. ConstAmend. 14.
5. Infante <*=155
If unwed father establishes substantial
relationship over number of years with his
children, his parental rights cannot be extinguished without his consent U.C.A.
1953, 7&-30-12.
6. Adoption <s=>7.2(3)
Children Out-of-Wedlock «=>12
Unwed father may file acknowledgment of parentage even before substantial
relationship has developed with child to acquire parental rights which unwed mother
cannot divest, and unwed father then has
same rights to consent to adoption of child
as mother. U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4.
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7. Adoption <&=»7.2(3)
Constitutional Law <3=>225.1
Unwed father was not denied equal
protection when his alleged child was
placed for' adoption without his consent,
where father failed to file acknowledgment
of paternity prior to relinquishment of
child, father failed to communicate concern
for an interest in child apart from few
visits with child, father did not come forth
after birth of child to assert claim to paternity nor did he agree to support child,
father denied paternity for major part of
pregnancy, and father, even after admitting paternity, never indicated to mother or
anyone else any desire to marry her, to live
together with her and child, or even to
personally raise child. U.C.A.1953, 78-304; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
8. Constitutional Law <$=>46<1), 225.1
In action by father claiming violation
of equal protection when his alleged child
was adopted without his consent, court
would not consider father's argument that
adoption violated equal protection provisions of State Constitution, after deciding
that adoption did not violate equal protection provisions of United States Constitution, where father did not argue specific
differences between state constitutional
provisions and United States constitutional
provisions. U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4; U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 14; Const Art 1, § 24.
9. Adoption «=»2
Constitutional Law <s»274(5)
Statute precluding unwed father from
asserting parental rights if father did not
file acknowledgment of paternity prior to
mother's relinquishment of child for adoption did not violate due process clause by
creating irrebuttable presumption of father's abandonment of child as father could
not abandon child until parental rights existed, and father never filed acknowledgment of paternity or establish substantial
relationship with child in order to create
parental rights. Const Art 1, § 7; U.C.A.
1953, 78-30-4, 78-30-12; U.S.C.A. Const
Amend. 14.

10. Children Out-of-Wedlock <*»12
Constitutional Law <3=>274(5)
- Precluding unwed father from asserting parental rights after father fails to file
acknowledgment of paternity prior to
mother's relinquishment of child for adoption is contrary to basic notions of due
process where father comes forward within
reasonable time after baby's birth, and father was not afforded reasonable opportunity to comply with statutory requirement
of filing acknowledgment of parentage.
Const Art. 1, § 7; U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4;
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
11. Adoption <3=»7.2(3)
Constitutional Law <3=>274(5)
Precluding unwed father from asserting parental rights after filing of adoption
petition did not violate due process where
father did not file acknowledgment of paternity, father was aware of time and location of child's birth, father told mother
prior to child's birth that father was not
going to marry her, live with her, or assume financial responsibility for her or for
baby, father told mother that adoption
should be mother's decision, father refused
to sign acknowledgment of paternity on
child's birth certificate at hospital, and father understood system as he had relinquished his rights to previous child a year
earlier; even though mother misled father
by stating that she had taken child to California and child died after giving child up
for adoption. Const Art 1, § 7; U.C.A.
1953, 78-30-4; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
M. David Eckersley (argued), Prince,
Yeates & Geldzahler, and Billy L. Walker,
Jr., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
David M. McConkie, Merrill Nelson (argued), Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, Salt
Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
Before BENCH, GARFF and
JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
Appellant Steven Swayne appeals an order denying him custody of his illegitimate
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iild and seeks attorney fees under 42 U.S.
§ 1988 on the ground that Utah Code
on. § 78-30-4 (1987) unconstitutionally
tprived him of his parental rights. We
verse in part and affirm in part
Appellant and the mother, P., are the
iwed parents of the child whose custody
at issue. Appellant and P. began dating
id having sexual relations in late 1985.
While they were dating, P. supported
)pellant by allowing him to use her car
id by giving him money for his apartment
mt and other expenses. During this peri1 of time, appellant was also dating and
stving sexual relations with other women,
rior to dat ig P., appellant had fathered
aother child out of wedlock, who was born
i February 1986. Appellant signed papers
)nsenting to that child's adoption on Feblary 9, 1986.
Appellant became aware of the pregnanf in October 1986. He initially became
ngry, denying that the baby was his.
[owever, in April 1987, he informed memers of his family that he was the father of
tie child. His family then held a baby
hower for P. Appellant also approached
is sister about raising the child until such
ime as he became "more stable."
During the pregnancy, appellant and P.
esided in Salt Lake County but did not live
ogether. Prior to the baby's birth, appelant indicated that he did not intend to
narry anybody, including P., because "it
lidn't appeal" to him. He suggested to P.
hat if she decided to keep the baby, she
:ould live with his mother so long as she
;upported herself and paid half of the rent
i e never offered to live with her and the
>aby as a family unit. However, after P.
•elinquished the baby, appellant then offered to marry her "on paper" because it
'would make the baby legitimate." He
:old P. that they did not have to live together and that she would not need to tell her
parents, but that such an arrangement
would make their legal case better.
1. L.D.S. Social Services was licensed during the
relevant time period by the State of Utah as a
qualified child placement agency pursuant to
Utah'Code Ann. § 55-8a-l (1984) (repealed
1988), but receives no governmental funding

P. informed appellant in March 1987 that
her parents wanted her to relinquish the
baby for adoption. Appellant responded
that adoption should be P.'s decision, and
that if she did not want the baby she could
give it to him.
In March 1987, P. made an appointment
with respondent, L.D.S. Social Services,1 to
discuss placing the baby for adoption, but
did not keep the appointment because she
was undecided as to what to do. Although
she had considered keeping the baby and
living with appellants mother, she was uncertain that she would be able to meet the
financial requirements for that arrangement
P. gave birth to a daughter on June 4,
1987. Appellant was present in the delivery room during the birth and visited with
P. and the child during the two days they
were in the hospital.
Appellant was not present in the hospital
room when the nurse filled out the birth
certificate and informed P. that appellant
had to sign an acknowledgment of paternity form in front of a notary public to have
his name entered as the father on the
baby's birth certificate. When appellant
later visited P., she had the form in her
hospital room and informed him that he
had to sign i t He did not sign it Consequently, the birth certificate does not indicate the identity of the father.
Later, appellant denied ever having seer,
the acknowledgment form, but stated that
he had told P. he wanted to put his name
on the birth certificate. He admitted, however, that he knew he was supposed to sign
something in the hospital to get his name
on the birth certificate.
On Saturday June 6, 1987, P. was discharged from the hospital. P.'s mother
assumed financial responsibility and took
P. and the baby to her home. Appellant
did not pay any of the hospital bills but did
eventually pay $45 toward the obstetrician's bill.
and has no governmental agency or entity involved in its internal operation, affairs, or decisions except as expressly authorized by the licensing statute.
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F.'s
made an appointment with
respondent . r June 8, 1987, so that P.
could discuss placing the baby for adoption.
On June 8, P. brought the baby to appellant's apartment for a visit. She did not
inform him that she was planning to place
the baby for adoption. The same day, P.
and her parents took the baby to respondent where a counselor explained the adoption process to them. During this meeting,
P. told the counselor that appellant had no
interest in marriage nor in living with and
supporting her and the baby.
The counselor told P. that the decision to
place the baby for adoption was hers alone
to make and that if she was not sure, she
could place the baby in temporary foster
care until she decided. P. decided that it
was in the baby's best interest to place her
for adoption. She then signed an affidavit
and release relinquishing custody of the
baby to respondent to place her for adoption, stating that she was doing this of her
own free will and choice, and that she
understood what she was doing.2
During the meeting, the counselor telephoned the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the
Utah Department of Health and inquired
whether an acknowledgment of paternity
had been filed for the child. She was informed that one had not been filed. Because it was late in the day, the counselor
permitted P. to take the baby home that
night and bring her back the following day.
On June 9, P. and the baby visited appellant at his apartment. She did not inform
him of the relinquishment, but told him
that she was going to California and was
taking the baby with her. She testified
that she was afraid to tell him about the
relinquishment because of his recent interest in the child, his potential retaliation
against her family, and because he was
upset that she was going to California. At

On June 29, appellant brought suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Federal District Court,
requesting custody of the child. J u ^ e J.
Thomas Greene found that the federal
court had jurisdiction over the case because
state action was present and the persons
involved in the adoption were state actors.
However, at respondent's request, Judge
Greene elected to abstain to allow the state
courts to interpret section 78-30-4, dismissing the case on September 3, 1987.

2. P. later testified that she was emotionally unstable at the time because she was concerned
over appellant's lack of commitment to her and
because of parental pressure in that her parents
had told her that she could have no contact with
her family if she kept the baby. She also stated
that she did not tell the counselor much about
her relationship with appellant because her parents, who did not like him, were in the room
with her. However, P., "[ajfter considering all

the circumstances, such as Steven's lack of interest in me and the baby, my inability to support and rear the baby alone, the problems of
bringing a ... baby into a possible marriage
with another man, and the need of the baby to
have a good home/' chose to relinquish the
baby. Her articulated reasons for relinquishing
indicate that, despite the emotional turmoil she
was going through, she had thought out and
deliberately made an uncoerced decision.

5:00 that afternoon, P. gave custody of the
baby to respondent and left for California
the following day, June 10. During this
trip, she called appellant each day and p r e
tended that she had the child with her.
Respondent transferred custody of the
baby to the adoptive parents on June 12,
1987. The child has resided with the adoptive parents ever since.
On June 13, P. called appellant's family
and, because she was afraid to tell appellant the truth, told them that the baby was
dead. Appellant's mother called the hospital in California to see if it had any record
of the baby and discovered the deception.
When appellant called P. back, she admitted her deception, informed appellant of
the adoption, and agreed to return to Salt
Lake City to help him attempt to gain
custody of the child.
On June 15, appellant filed an acknowledgment of paternity with the Registrar of
Vital Statistics. He and P. filed an affidavit to amend the child's birth certificate to
add his name as the father and to give the
child his last name. They then went to
respondent to ask for the child, but wtre
advised by the counselor that it was too
late, the child had already been placed with
adoptive parents, and that they would have
to contact their lawyers.
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Appellant then filed this state court acion on September 7, 1987, On September
4,1987, he filed a motion for a preliminary
njunction prohibiting respondent from coninuing to deny him custody of the child
luring the pendency of the state action.
On December 31, 1987, after an evideniary hearing, the trial judge denied appelant's motion, specifically finding that (I)
4
it was not impossible for [appellant] to
have filed his notice of claim of paternity
prior to the date the child was relinquished
for adoption"; (2) appellant, throughout
P.'s pregnancy, "did not behave in a manner consistent with that of a concerned,
committed father, nor did he clearly articulate an intent or desire to assume the
responsibilities of parenthood or to keep
and rear the child"; and (3) appellant, if
awarded custody of the child, would relinquish her to his sister to care for, rather
than caring for her himself.
On February 24,1988, respondent moved
for summary judgment
A hearing on this motion was held on
March 4, 1988. The court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment, dismissed appellant's action, and awarded
costs to respondent, finding that (1) there
was no genuine issue as to any material
fact; (2) respondent's acts did not constitute state action; and (3) section 78-30-4
was valid on its face and as applied under
the due process and equal protection provisions of the Utah and United States Constitutions.
On March 15, 1987, appellant filed a notice of appeal before this Court. His appeal raises the following issues: (1) Did
respondent's conduct constitute sufficient
"state action" to invoke constitutional protections? (2) If so, does section 78-30-4
(1987), as applied to the facts in this case,
violate the equal protection provisions of
the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 24
of the Utah Constitution, or the due process provisions of the first and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution? (3) Does section 78-30-4 vio-

late the provisions of article I, section 11 of
the Utah Constitution?
STATE ACTION
[1] The fourteenth amendment guarantees of equal protection and due process
apply "only if the deprivation of life, liberty, or property is by governmental 'state
action' rather than by purely private action." Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 670
F.Supp. 1537, 1540 (D.Utah 1987). This
case involves the termination of appellant's
parental rights, a liberty interest which has
repeatedly been recognized as worthy of
constitutional protection by the United
States Supreme Court Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct 1208, 1212, 31
L.Ed.2d 551 (1972).
The United States Supreme Court, in Lugar r. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
102 S.Ct 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982), delineated a two-prong test for determining
whether state action was involved in a deprivation: (1) the deprivation must be caused
by the exercise of a state-created right or
privilege, and (2) the party charged with
the deprivation must be a person who may
fairly be said to be a state actor. Id, at
941, 102 S.Ct at 2755; accord Dirks v.
CornwelU 754 P.2d 946, 950 (Utah CtApp.
1988). Respondent argues that its conduct
in placing the baby for adoption did not
constitute state action because the adoptive
placement of children is not the exclusive
prerogative of the state, so is not a statecreated right or privilege. Further, because respondent receives no state funding
and has no governmental control over its
internal affairs, it is not a state actor.
However, this argument sidesteps the real
issue, whether respondent may be considered to be a state actor in terminating
appellant's parental rights through the operation of section 78-30-4, rather than in
placing appellant's child for adoption.
Prior Utah cases interpreting section 7830-4, although not explicitly addressing
this state action issue, assume the existence of state action in the operation of this
statute. For example, the Utah Supreme
Court, in Wells v. Children '$ Aid Society
of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 206 (Utah 1984)
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(quoting In re Boyer, 636 R2d 1085, 108788 (Utah 1981)), stated that "[w]hen state
action impinges on fundamental rights, due
process requires standards which clearly
define the scope of permissible conduct so
as to avoid unwarranted intrusion on those
rights/'
We, therefore, concur with the finding of
the United States District Court in
Swayne, that state action indeed existed in
the present circumstances, because (1)
"[ujndoubtedly, the State was responsible
for the statute"; Swayne, 670 F.Supp. at
1541 (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 938, 102
S.Ct. at 2754); and (2) the statute involved
is self-operative and mandates the termination of appellant's parental rights. Id.
As Judge Greene explained:
The State of Utah, not a private party,
has made an official policy decision that
any time custody of an illegitimate child
is relinquished by the mother, the father's parental rights will be automatically cut off unless a notice of paternity
previously has been filed by the biological father. That state decision to terminate the father s parental rights is implemented through the actor or actors who
accept the child for placement, whether a
state entity, a private licensed adoption
agency, or any other person, for example
an attorney. It would be a total fiction
to allow the state to remove itself from
its decision to cut off parental rights
simply because a private party triggers
operation of the statute. The only fair
conclusion is that such a private party
becomes a "state actor" when his or her
actions bring the statute into play so as
to effectuate the pre-determined state decision to terminate parental rights.
Id. at 1541-42 (emphasis in original).
Judge Greene also noted that even though
a private party may deprive a parent of the
physical custody of his child, only the state
may irrevocably sever all parental rights.
Thus, state action is present in the operation of section 78-30-4. IdL at 1542.
In view of this determination, we reverse
the lower court's finding that state action
did not exist Because we have determined
state action does exist in the operation of
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section 78-30-4, the question becomes
whether this state action has deprived appellant of his constitutional rights.
EQUAL PROTECTION
[2] Appellant first argues that section
78-30-4, as applied to these facts, violates
his constitutional right to equal protection
under the United States Constitution. He
asserts that the similarly situated parents
of an illegitimate child are given different
legal rights solely on the basis of their sex
since the mother's consent is required prior
to any adoption of the child regardless of
whether she is willing to fulfill her parental
responsibilities while the father has the
right to consent to the child's adoption only
if he files an acknowledgment of paternity
indicating his willingness and intent to support the child pursuant to section 78-30-4.
"The essence of equal protection is that
legislative classifications resulting in differing treatment for different persons
must be based on actual differences that
are reasonably related to the legitimate
purposes of the legislation."
Mountain
Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988). Although
appellant recognizes the legitimacy of the
purposes of section 78-30-4, \ hich are to
speedily identify those persons who will
assume the parental role over illegitimate
children and to facilitate immediate and
continuing physical care of and emotional
bonding opportunities for such children,
Wells, 681 P.2d at 204, he alleges that the
classifications of section 78-30-4 are based
on differences that are not reasonably related to these purposes. He first states
that the statute defeats its objective by
failing to require the mother of an illegitimate child to take action to identify herself
as a willing parent as fathers are required
to do since an unfit and indifferent mother
can prevent the adoption of her child and,
thus, fail to provide appropriate physical
care and emotional bonding opportunities
for the child. He then states that the
statutory objective is also defeated because
it results in gender-based discrimination
against "identified, present, and willing fathers" who would, in fact, provide the necessary care and bonding opportunities for
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the child, and that an indifferent mother
can arbitrarily deprive such a father of his
parental rights under the statute.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Ellis v. Social Services Department of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615
P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), has held that .section
78-30-4 does nut, or. r s face, violate the
equal protection rights of an unwed father
because the father's parental rights are the
same as the mother's and the same as if
the child had been born legitimate, providing he timely files hi: acknowledgment < f
paternity pursuant to the statute. Where
the father fails to come forward by timely
filing an acknowledgment of paternity or
by developing a substantial relationship
with the child, the equal protection clause
does not preclude the state from terminating his parental rights. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394, 99 S.Ct. 1760,
1769, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979).
In Wells, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed Ellis, finding that there are reasonable bases for statutory differentiation
between unwed mothers and fathers and
between fathers who file an acknowledgment of paternity and those who do not.
Wells, 681 P.2d at 204. The court also
found that these classifications are reasonably calculated to serve the proper governmental objectives of (1) promptly identifying those fathers who will acknowledge
parental responsibilities, and (2) speedily
making children available for adoption. Id.
The Wells court, although recognizing that
many unwed fathers are unidentified and
uninterested, stated that:
fathers who have "fulfilled a parental
role over a considerable period of time
are entitled to a high degree of protection," whereas unwed fathers "whose relationships to their children are merely
biological or very attenuated" are entitled to a lesser degree of protection.
"When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his
child/ his interest in personal contact
with his child acquires substantial protection under the due process clause
But the mere existence of a biological

link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection."
Id. at 203 (quoting In re J.P., 648 P.2d
1364, 1375 (Utah 1982) and Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62, 103 S.Ct. 2985,
2993, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983)) (emphasis in
original).
[3} On the other hand, unlike unwed
fathers, unwed mothers a^e "automatically
identified by virtue of their role in the
process of birth." Wells, 681 P.2d at 203.
However, if shown to be an unfit or indifferent parent on account of cruelty, neglect, or desertion of the child, a mother
may have her parental rights judicially terminated and the child put up for adoption
without her consent pursuant to section
78-30-4(1). Her parental rights will be terminated if she is shown to be unwilling to
fulfill her parental responsibilities.
Thus, appellant's argument that the statutory classifications are based on gender
differences that are not reasonably related
to the statutory purposes fails.
[4] Appellant next argues that we
should not follow the Utah Supreme
Court's reasoning in Ellis because, as he
asserts, that opinion was based upon inherently contradictory statutory provisions
found in sections 78-30-4 and 78-30-12.
He argues that the protection afforded
unwed fathers under section 78-30-12 is
illusory because a father who has publicly
acknowledged his child may lose his parental rights anyway by failing to file under
section 7&-30-4.
In In the Matter of the Adoption of
T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah CtApp.
1988), this Court recently rejected this argument, holding that these two statutes
are not inconsistent but operate independently in the appropriate factual contexts:
We interpret the statutes [sections 7830-4 and 78-30-12] as follows: when the
unwed father acknowledges his child,
within the meaning of the acknowledgment statute [section 78-30-12], prior to
the mother's relinquishment of the child
or prior to the filing of the petition for
adoption, then the father need not comply with the requirements of the paterni-

SWAYNE v. L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES
Cite m» 761 ?JA 932 (UuhApp. 1988)

ty statute [section 78-30-4], However, if
the claimed acts of acknowledgment occur after the mother's relinquishment .>r
after the petition for adoption has been
filed, then the paternity statute [section
78-30-4] governs.
Id, at p. 910. Thus, contrary to appellant's
argument, the protections offered the
unwed father under section 78-30-12 are
not illusory because section 78-30-4 does
not apply to him if he has fulfilled the
adoption by acknowledgment requirements.
He is protected under both sections.
[5,6] If an unwed father establishes a
substantial relationship over a number of
years with his children, his rights cannot be
extinguished without his consent under section 78-30-12. Ellis, 615 P.2d at 1255.
Similarly, a caring, involved unwed father
may file pursuant to section 78-30-4 even
before such a substantial relationship has
developed to acquire the same rights. The
unwed mother cannot, then, arbitrarily divest him of parental rights and the unwed
father has the same rights to consent to
the adoption of his child as the mother.
[7] Although appellant argues that section 78-30-4 violates his constitutional
right to equal protection as applied, he
raises no discernable argument on facts
unique to this case: He failed to file an
acknowledgement of paternity prior to the
relinquishment of the child, and failed to
communicate concern for and interest in
the child apart from his few visits with her.
He did not come forth after the birth of the
child to assert his claim to paternity nor did
he agree to support the child. He denied
paternity for the major part of the pregnancy and, even after admitting paternity,
never indicated to the mother or to anyone
else any desire to marry her, to live together with her and the child, or even to personally raise the child. As such, it is not
unjust for him to be classified with other
3. Stanley is inapposite to this case because of
distinguishable facts: Peter Stanley was deprived of his children with whom he had lived
and had raised for eighteen years. Upon the
death of the children's mother, they were placed
with court-appointed guardians pursuant to an
Illinois statute which required that'children of
unwed fathers become wards of the state upon
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similarly situated unwed fathers who have
lost their parental rights by not coming
forward to acknowledge their parental responsibilities.
[8] Appellant's fourth argument is that
section 78-30-4 violates the equal protection provisions of the Utah Constitution.
"As a general rule, we will not engage in
state constitutional analysis unless an argument for different analyses under the
state and federal constitutions is briefed."
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n. 5
(Utah 1988). Because appellant has not set
forth a separate state constitutional analysis in his brief, we do not respond to this
argument. Merely stating that the statute
violates the Utah Constitution without arguing the specific conflicts is not sufficient.
We find that appellant's equal protection
argument fails.
DUE PROCESS
Appellant asserts that section 78-30-4
violates the due process clauses of the
United States and Utah Constitutions. He
argues that the statute operates to terminate an unwed father's parental rights before any adjudication of abandonment occurs, thus making failure to file an acknowledgment of paternity an irrebuttable
presumption that he has abandoned his
child. Relying on Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 657, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1215, 31 L.Ed.
2d 551 (1971), which states that procedures
cannot stand which "explicitly [disdain]
present realities in deference to past formalities," 3 he asserts that the statute violates due process because the fact presumed, abandonment, does not follow from
his actual behavior in that he visited the
child daily for the four days following the
child's birth, invited his family to visit her,
publicly acknowledged his paternity, and
never clearly expressed an intention to relinquish his parental rights.
the death of their mothers. Stanley, 405 U.S. at
646, 92 S.CL at 1210. The Court found this
statute to be unconstitutional because it created
an irrebuttable presumption that unwed fathers
were unfit parents. In the present case, appellant has not developed a comparable substantial
relationship with his child.
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This argument is, essentially, an attack
on the constitutionality of the statute. The
Utah Supreme Court has already settled
this issue in Wells. Applying an even more
stringent standard oi review than required
under the United States Constitution because of the fundamental nature of parental rights, the Wells court determined that
section 78-30-4 is facially ^alid under the
due process clause of the Utah Constitution
because (1) the state has a compelling interest in speedily identifying those persons
who will assume a parental role over newborn illegitimate children, and (2) the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve these
purposes because there is no infringement
of the unwed father's rights not essential
to the statute's purposes. Wells, 681 P.2d
at 206-07.
[9] Further, appellant misconstrues the
import of the statute. Because of his
unwed status, he does not have p. rental
rights subject to termination until he asserts them by either filing an acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to section 7830-4 or by establishing a substantial relationship with the child pursuant to section
78-30-12. If he does either of the above,
he preserves his parental rights. If he
fails to come forward, he has no parental
rights to abandon. The statute cannot create an irrebuttable presumption of abandonment where parental rights do not exist.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that
the nature of this subject matter make> a
firm cutoff date reasonable, if not essential, because of the disruption to the children involved by the protracted litigation
that a contrary holding would produce.
Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, 680
P.2d 753, 755-56 (Utah 1984). Further,
marriage is the institution established by
society for the procreation and rearing of
children, and because of the disproportionate number of social problems involving
illegitimate children, it is not
too harsh to require that those responsible for bringing children into the world
outside the established institution of
marriage should be required either to
comply with those statutes that accord

them the opportunity to assert their parental rights or to yield to the method
established by society to raise children in
a manner best suited to promote their
welfare.
Id at 756; see also Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263,
103 S.Ct at 2994.
[10] Appellant also argues that section
78-30-4, as applied, violates his due process rights. The Utah Supreme Court has
recognized that situations may arise in
which it is impossible, through no fault of
his own, for an unwed father to file the
required notice of paternity prior to the
statutory bar. In re Adoption of Baby
Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 689 (Utah 1986);
Ellis, 615 P.2d at 1256. In such a situation, due process requires that the unwed
father be permitted to show that he was
not afforded a reasonable opportunity to
comply with the statute. If the father
successfully shows that termination of his
parental rights is contrary to basic notions
of due process and if he comes forward
within a reasonable time after the baby's
birth, he is deemed to have complied with
the statute. Ellis, 615 P.2d at 1256.
Such situations existed in Ellis and in
Baby Boy Doe. In Ellis, the child's mother and father resided in California. The
mother left California just prior to the
child's birth without advising the father as
to where the birth was to occur. When the
child was born, she declared the father to
be unknown, and relinquished the child
four days later. The court found that the
father was entitled to an opportunity to
show, as a factual matter, that he could not
reasonably have expected his baby to be
born in Utah. Id. at 1256.
Likewise, in Baby Boy Doe, the father
was not a Utah resident and had spent less
than a week in the state. Prior to the
baby's birth, the mother had told the father
that she would move to Arizona with him,
thus alleviating any concern he might have
had about a potential adoption. The father
then travelled to Arizona, found employment and a place to live, and moved the
couple's belongings from California to Arizona. Because all parties were aware of
the father's intent and desire to raise the
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child, the mother's family deliberately withheld information about the child's birth to
avoid his obstruction of the adoption. The
baby was born early while the father was
travelling from California to Arizona, Consequently, the father was unaware of the
birth for three days, and only became
aware of it one day after the petition for
adoption had been filed. This father successfully showed that the termination of
his parental rights was contrary to the
basic notions of due process and that he
came forward within a reasonable time after the baby's birth. Thus, the court
deemed him to have complied with the statute. Baby Boy Doe, 111 P.2d at 690-91.
This "impossibility'1' exception is inapplicable, however, in cases which do not involve situations where it is impossible for
the father to file the required notice
through no fault of his own. Wells, 681
P.2d at 207.
The Wells court found that no impossibility existed under the following facts: The
birth occurred in the same state as the
father's residence. Neither the child's
mother nor the adoption agency were involved in an effort to prevent the father
from learning of the birth or from asserting his parental rights. Neither knew at
the time of the relinquishment that the
father was seeking to assert his parental
rights. The father had advance notice of
the expected time of the birth and the fact
that the mother intended to relinquish the
child for adoption. Further, the father had
advice of counsel on filing the required
form, and had a copy of the form provided
by a social worker. Id. at 207-08.
Likewise, in Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social
Services, the court determined that section
78-30-4 was no* unconstitutionally applied:
Both parents were Utah residents. Prior
to the birth, the mother had told the father
she would not live with nor marry him and
that she was considering adoption. Together, the couple attended a counseling
session at the agency which later took custody of the child for adoption. The father
visited the mother and child in the hospital
prior to the time the child was relinquished.
On the day the child was relinquished, the

Utah 941

mother called the father and told him to
come to the hospital if he wanted to see the
baby one last time. When the father went
to the hospital, he did not protest the mother's decision to place the child for adoption,
but did attempt to sign the birth certificate.
He then filed a notice of paternity after the
baby was relinquished for adoption. Baby
Boy Doe, 717 P.2d at 690; Sanchez, 680
P.2d at 75.
[11] In the present situation, both appellant and P. were residents of Salt Lake
County at the time the child was born.
Appellant WL< aware of the time and location of the child's birth. As in Sanchez, no
one had attempted to withhold from appellant any information regarding the child's
birth. Appellant had made it clear to P.
prior to the child's birth that he was not
going to marry her, live with her, or assume any financial rer; sibility for her or
for the baby. As in Sanchez, appellant
was present at the birth and visiteu P. and
the child in the hospital. Appellant knew
of the possibility of the child's adoption
from March 1987 when P. told him that her
parents wanted her to relinquish the child.
He told her that adoption should be her
decision. At the hospital, appellant was
instructed by P. that he had to sign an
acknowledgment of paternity to appear as
the father on the child's birth certificate,
but did not sign i t P. signed the relinquishment on June 8th, four days after the
child was born, and surrendered custody on
June 9th. Although reprehensible, P.'s attempt to mislead appellant about the relinquishment by telling h H that she had taken the child to California and that the child
had died was irrelevant because it came
after the fact.
Appellant had every reasonable opportunity to register prior to the act of relinquishment. He also had actual knowledge
of the requirement to register, not only
from P.'s informing him of this necessity at
the hospital, but also because he, himself,
had relinquished his rights to a previous
child a year earlier.
These facts more closely resemble those
in Wells and Sanchez, in which the impossibility exception was inapplicable, than
those in Ellis and Baby Boy Doe. We
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concur with the trial court and find that
appellant had an opportunity to file his
acknowledgment of paternity, and that it
was not impossible for him to do so prior to
the relinquishment through no fault of his
own. As the Sanchez court stated, "[i]t is
of no constitutional importance that the
father came close to complying with the
statute/ 1 Sanchez, 680 P.2d at 755. We,
therefo/e, hold that section 78-30-4 was
not unconstitutionally applied to appellant.
OPEN COURTS
Finally, appellant raises the issue of
whether section 78-30-4 violates the open
court provisions in article I section 11 of
the Utah Constitution. Appellant did not
raise this issue below, but first raised it on
appeal to this court. As a general rule, we
do not consider issues raised for the first
time on appeal, so decline to address this
issue. Rekward v. Indus. Comm'n, 755
P.2d 166, 168 (Utah Ct.App.1988); James v.
Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah CtApp.
1987).
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
We reverse the trial court's ruling concerning state action, but affirm the order denying appellant custody of the child. Because appellant is not the prevailing party,
we do not address the issue of attorney
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Each part}' is
to bear its own costs on appeal.
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
JZ\
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Laura Lee Bloxham FULLMER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Brian Keith FULLMER, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 870499-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Sept. 16, 1988.
Action was brought to modify child
custody provision of divorce decree. The

Fourth District Court, Utah County, Boyd
L. Park, J., transferred custody, and appeal
was taken. The Court of Appeals, Billings,
J., held that custodial parent's placement of
child in day care when she took full-time
employment did not constitute change of
circumstances sufficient to warrant transfer of custody.
Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.

1. Divorce <8=»184(5, 6)
Where all evidence in divorce decree
modification suit was offered by proffer,
reviewing court would review proffered
facts and draw its own legal conclusions
therefrom; trial court's decision would not
be disturbed absent showing of abuse o r
discretion or manifest injustice.
2. Divorce <s=>303(2)
In order to modify child custody provisions of divorce decree, trial court must
consider whether there has been substantial change in custodial parent's circumstances justifying reexamination of prior
custody award, and, if such change has
occurred, determine what placement is in
best interest of child.
3. Divorce <s=>303(2)
In determining whether change of circumstances warrants reopening of child
custody provisions of divorce decree, court
must focus exclusively on evaluation of
custodial parent's change of circumstances
and effect on child; only if change of circumstances io found to exist may court
address issue of noncustodial parent's
changing circumstances, as part of determination of whether it is in best interest of
child to transfer custody.
4. Divorce <s=»3Q3(2)
Fact that custodial parent took fulltime work and placed child in day care was
within reasonable contemplation of noncustodial parent at time he stipulated to custody arrangement, and thus was not legally
cognizable change of circumstance such as
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Liberal, Kansas. Thus, in order to keep
presentation of evidence to the jury running smoothly, it would be more expeditious to try the case in Topeka. The court
notes that the defendants represent that
Fred Phelps, plaintiffs counsel, has agreed
that the case should be tried in Topeka.
The court therefore finds that defendants'
Bunnell and Arheart's motion to transfer
the trial setting to Topeka is hereby granted.
IT IS BY THE COURT THEREFORE
ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of the Court's Memorandum
and Order filed April 8, 1987, which granted summary judgment to defendant Duckworth on the grounds of judicial immunity
is hereby denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for leave to
file a second amendment to her complaint
is granted in part. Plaintiff shall have
leave to file a second amendment to name
the State of Kansas as a party defendant.
Plaintiffs motion for leave to file a second
amendment to the complaint which names
Keaton G. Duckworth as a defendant is
hereby denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants Bunnell and
Arheart's motion to transfer the tnal setting to Topeka is hereby granted.
DATED: This 26th day of June, 1987, at
Kansas City, Kansas.

Steven H. SWAYNE, Plaintiff,
v.
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, John Doe,
Jane Doe and Leslie Doe, in his or her
official capacity as a District Court
Judge of the Third District Court of the
State of Utah, Defendants.
Civ. No. 87-C-0591G.
United States District Court,
D Utah, CD.

tempted to gain right of custody, care and
control of newborn child who had been
surrendered by mother to private adoption
agency. On motion to dismiss by adoption
agency and prospective adoptive parents,
and putative father's motion for preliminary injunction, the District Court, J.
Thomas Greene, J., held that: (1) private
adoption agency and prospective adoptive
parents were "state actors" through utilization of adoption statute for purposes of
father's § 1983 action; (2) proper persons
were named as parties; and (3) abstention
by federal court was required.
Motion to dismiss granted.

1. Civil Rights o=>13.5(4)
Invocation of state statute, which required that any time custody of illegitimate
child is relinquished by mother, father's
parental rights will be automatically cut off
unless notice of paternity previously has
been filed by biological father, by private
individual such as adoption agency or attorney constitutes state action for purposes of
§ 1983 civil rights action brought 1/ biological father for purposes of regaining
custody of infant. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983;
U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4.
2. Civil Rights <s=»13.11
In § 1983 action by putative father for
determination of his parental rights, which
challenged operation of statute which provided that father of illegitimate child conclusively is presumed to have abandoned
child if he fails to file claim of paternity
and notice of willingness to support child
prior to time child is placed by mother with
licensed adoption agency, father was only
required to name as parties child's mother
who relinquished all custody and control of
child, adoption agency, and prospective
adoptive parents. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983;
U.C.A.1953, 7&-30-4.

Sept. 3, 1987.
Putative father of infant brought action pursuant to § 1983 in which he at-

3. Federal Courts <3=>48
Federal court abstained from rendering decision in putative father's challenge
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to termination of his parental rights by
operation of state adoption statute, though
he named proper parties in § 1983 action;
father may be able to establish that as
applied, state statute was violative of
greater protections of State Constitution,
thereby mooting federal constitutional
question and case presented important
questions of state law. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983; U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4.
M. David Eckersley, Billy L. Walker, Jr.,
Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff.
David M. McConkie, B. Lloyd Poelman,
Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
J. THOMAS GREENE, District
Judge.
This matter came on for hearing on July
27, 1987 on defendants' motion to dismiss
and plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction. Defendants were represented by
David M. McConkie and B. Lloyd Poelman
and plaintiff was represented by M. David
Eckersley and Billy L. Walker, Jr. Plaintiff and defendants submitted memorandums of law and a stipulated statement of
facts and the court heard oral argument,
after which the matters were taken under
advisement. The court is now fully advised and sets forth its Memorandum Decision and Order.
BACKGROUND
This suit is brought by plaintiff against
L.D.S. Social Services, a non-profit private
adoption agency affiliated with the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; John
Doe and Jane Doe, who are prospective
adoptive parents of the newborn child of
which plaintiff is the biological father, and
Leslie Doe, who is asserted to be a District
Court Judge of the Third District Court of
Utah who plaintiff believes has presently
before him or her a petition for adoption.
Plaintiff has brought suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and requests that this court declare
that he has the right of custody, care and
control of the newborn child, that the provi-

sions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4 (1984)
be declared violative of the United States
Constitution, that Judge Doe be enjoined
from entering any Decree of Adoption
without plaintiffs consent, and that damages be awarded as against defendant
L.D.S. Social Services. The immediate matter of a preliminary injunction involves a
request by plaintiff that he be granted
custody and that defendant L.D.S. Social
Services be enjoined from continuing to
exercise custody over the chilJ
Plaintiff and defendants have filed a
statement containing the following stipulated facts:
1. Steven Swayne is the natural father of a baby girl born out of wedlock
on June 4, 1987.
2. Penny Paxman is the mother of
the child.
3. Both Steven Swayne and Penny
Paxman are life-long residents of the
State of Utah and resided in the State of
Utah at all times pertinent to the facts
and circumstances in this matter
4. Steven Swayne first learned that
Penny Paxman wras pregnant in October,
1986.
5. Steven Swayne and Penny Paxman
are not now married nor have they ever
been married. At no time during Penny
Paxman's pregnancy or prior to the relinquishment of the child to L.D.S. Social
Services did Steven Swayne offer to marry Penny Paxman or offer to financially
support Penny Paxman.
6. At no time during the pregnancy
or prior to the relinquishment of the child
did Steven Swayne and Penny Paxman
have any plan or intention to live together in a family unit.
7. Steven Swayne was present in the
hospital when the child was born on June
4, 1987, and visited the child and Perm}
Paxman while they were in the hospital
While in the hospital, Mr. Swayne was
told that it was necessary for him to sign
a document in order to have his name
placed on the child's birth certificate.
Mr. Swayne did not sign the necessary
document or acknowledgment of paternity before the child was discharged from
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the hospital or before the child was relinquished to L.D.S. Social Services and
therefore his name does not appear on
the child's birth certificate.
8. Penny Paxman's mother discharged Penny and the baby from the
hospital on June 6,1987, and made financial arrangements for hospital expenses.
Mr. Swayne has not paid any of the
hospital expenses or paid any of the expenses for the baby's support.
9. Prior to the pregnancy and during
the course of the pregnancy, Penny Paxman resided with her parents. After being released from the hospital, Penny
Paxman and her child returned to her
parent's home.
10. Steven Swayne offered to make
arrangemerts for Penny Paxman to
move in with his mother. However, Penny Paxman would have provided her own
living expenses.
11. Penny Paxman signed an affidavit releasing the child to L.D.S. Social
Services on June 8, 1987, and physically
surrendered custody of the child the next
day.
12. Steven Swayne did not register
with the Registrar of Vital Statistics in
the Department of Health a notice of his
claim of paternity of an illegitimate child
and of his willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability
prior to the date the illegitimate child
was relinquished or placed with L.D.S.
•Social Services for adoption.
13. Steven Swayne filed his acknowledgment of paternity on June 15, 1987,
which was the first working day after he
learned that the child had been placed for
adoption.
14 During the course of the pregnancy, Steven Swayne and Penny Paxman
discussed the fact that Penny Paxman's
parents wanted her to place the baby for
adoption. Penny Paxman did not inform
Mr. Swayne that she did or did not intend
to surrender the child for adoption.
15 L.D.S. Social Services placed the
child for adoption with an adoptive family on June 12, 1987, in conformity with
the requirements of Utah statutes.

16. In the event Steven Swayne is
granted custody of the child, Mr. Swayne
intends to place the child under the primary care of members of his family until
such time as he can become more stable.
17. On June 15, 1987, Steven Swayne
and Penny Paxman requested an amendment to the birth certificate of the child
naming Steven Swayne as the father of
the child.
18. During the course of the pregnancy and thereafter Mr. Swayne told his
family and others that he was the father
of the child.
19. Penny Paxman took the baby to
Steven Swayne's apartment for a short
visit once before the relinquishment to
L.D.S. Social Services and once after the
relinquishment.
20. Mr. Swayne was unaware of his
duty to file an acknowledgment of paternity and willingness to support the child
until after the child had been released by
the mother for adoption.
21. On June 15, 1987, both Mr.
Swayne and Penny Paxman appeared at
the offices of L.D.S. Social Services and
asked that custody be given to Mr.
Swayne.
22. L.D.S. Social Services has testified that at the time of the relinquishment of the child to L.D.S. Social Services Penny Paxman did not disclose the
identity of Steven Swayne and advised
L.D.S. Social Services that he would not
take responsibility for the child and that
she did not want L.D.S. Social Services to
contact him.
23. On February 9, 1986, Steven
Swayne consented to the adoptive placement of another illegitimate child by a
different woman. L.D.S. Social Services
requested and obtained his consent.
Defendant L.D.S. Social Services urges
this court to dismiss plaintiffs complaint
for lack of jurisdiction because of failure to
allege "state action,'' and on the further
ground that this court should abstain from
exercising jurisdiction in favor of resolution by the state courts of Utah. The
defendants also urge dismissal of plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction pri-
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marily because of lack of substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
I. State Action
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part
"No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." (emphasis added). The protections
of the Fourteenth Amendment thus apply
only if the deprivation of life, liberty, or
property is by governmental "state action"
rather by than purely private action. The
fundamental policies of the state action
principle are to preserve an area of individ1. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 VS. 922.
936-37, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753. 73 L.Ed.2d 482
(1982); Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250,
83 S.Ct. 1119, 1133, 10 L.Ed.2d 323 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); GviV Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17, 3 S.Ct. 18, 25, 27 L.Ed. 835
(1883); see generally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 18^2 at 1149 (1978).
2. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct.
1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) the Court recognized the weighty "liberty" interest of one father
of illegitimate children in maintaining custody
of those children with whom he had a fully
developed parental relationship:
The private interest here, that of a man in the
children he has sired and raised, undeniably
warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection. It is plain
that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or
her children "come[s] to this Court with a
momentum for respect lacking when appeal is
made to liberties which derive merely from
shifting economic arrangements." Kovacs v.
Cooper [336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448. 93 L.Ed. 513
(1949)].... The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The
rights to conceive and to raise one's children
have been deemed "essential," Meyer v. Nebraska (262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed.
1042 (1923)] ... "basic civil rights of man,"
Skinner v. Oklahoma, [316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct.
1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942)] ... and M[r]ights
far more precious ... than property rights,"
May v. Anderson [345 U.S. 528. 73 S.Ct. 840,
97 LEd. 1221 (1953)].... "It is cardinal
with us that the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary' function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither

ual freedom to make choices without the
constraints of the Constitution's prohibitions, to further the policy of federalism by
reserving to the state discretion to deal
with perceived private wrongs without the
constraints of supreme federal law, and to
further the policy of separation of powers
by limiting the wrongs redressable by the
federal judiciary absent congressional enactment granting such authority.1
The "liberty" interest asserted by plaintiff in this case involves termination of all
parental rights in connection with his newborn child, including visitation and custodial rights. Without delving deeply into the
merits, this court recognizes that plaintiff
has asserted a liberty interest that has
been acknowledged by the Supreme Court
to be worthy of constitutional protection.2
supply nor hinder" Prince v. Massachusetts
[321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645
(1944)]....
Id. at 651, 92 S.Ct. at 1212. More recently the
Court distinguished the lesser constitutional interest of a putative father in the potential to
develop a future parental relationship with his
child:
The difference between the developed parentchild relationship that was implicated in Stanley and Caban [v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) ]. and the
potential relationship involved in Quillom [v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d
511 (1978)] and this case, is both clear and
significant. When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing] forward to
participate in the rearing of his child," Caban,
... his interest in personal contact with his
child acquires substantial protection under
the Due Process Clause. At that point it may
be said that he "act[s] as a father toward his
children
" But the mere existence of a
biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection ... The significance of
the biological connection is that it offers the
natural father an opportunity that no other
male possesses to develop a relationship with
his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity
and accepts some measure of responsibiiit}
for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make
uniquely valuable contributions to the child's
development. If he fails to do so, the Federal
Constitution will not automatically compel a
State to listen to his opinion of where the
child's best interests lie.
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62, 103
S.Ct. 2985, 2993. 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (emphasis added). Some courts and commentators
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The statute which plaintiff seeks to challenge under due process and equal protection provides that the father of an illegitimate child conclusively is presumed to
have abandoned his child if he fails to file a
claim of paternity and notice of willingness
to support the child prior to the time the
child is placed by the mother with a licensed adoption agency, or prior to the
time a petition is filed by a person with
whom the mother has placed the child for
adoption.3 Trie state action question is
whether termination of plaintiffs parental
rights by operation of the above statute
implicates the actors in a private adoption
to the extent that they may be considered
to be state actors for the purpose of testing
whether plaintiff's parental rights were
constitutionally terminated. This court is
persuaded that the statute has such an
effect. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482
(1982) the Supreme Court delineated a twostep inquiry in resolving the issue of state
action:
First, the deprivation must be caused by
the exercise of some right or privilege
created by the Stat:- or by a rule of
conduct imposed by the State or by a
person for whom the State is responsible
Second, the party charged
with the deprivation must be a person
have determined that the potential interest recognized in Lehr may require greater constitutional protection if it is asserted, as in this case,
at or near the time of birth rather than after a
significant lapse of time as in Lehr. See In re
Matter of Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 358
S.E.2d 459 (1987); In re Baby Girl M, 37 Cal.3d
65, 207 Cal.Rptr. 309, 68S P.2d 918, 924 (1984);
E. Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of
Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, AS Ohio St.L.Rev. 313, 351-371 (1984).
That question need not be resolved in analyzing
state action. It should be noted, however, that
the liberty interest asserted here is subject to the
lesser protection of Lehr as an opportunity to
develop a relationship with the child, rather
than non-interruption of an existing relationship.
3.

The statute reads in relevant part:
(1) A child cannot be adopted without the
consent of each living parent having rights in
relation to said child
(3)(a) A person who is the father or claims to
be the father of an illegitimate child may

who may fairly be said to be a state
actor.
Id. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2753-54. There can
be no question but that under Utah's statutory scheme the first part of the Lugar
test is met. "Undoubtedly the State was
responsible for the statute." Lugar, 457
U.S. at 938, 102 S.Ct. at 2754. Since the
first test is met, this court must determine
whether operation of the statute in this
case implicates defendants L.D.S. Social
Services and the prospective adoptive parents to a degree whereby they "may fairly
be said to be state actor[s]." Id. at 937,
102 S.Ct at 2754.
[1] In focusing on the second determination, there is a critical distinction in the
operation of the above statute as compared
with many other state laws which may be
invoked by private parties. Here, the statute involved is self-operative and mandates the resultant termination of an illegitimate father's parental rights. The
State of Utah, not a private party, has
made an official policy decision that anytime custody of an illegitimate child is relinquished by the mother, the father's parental rights will be automatically cut off
unless a notice of paternity previously has
been filed by the biological father. That
state decision to terminate the father's paclaim rights pertaining to his paternity of the
child by registering with the registrar of vital
statistics in the department of health, a notice
of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate
child and of his willingness and intent to
support the child to the best of his ability
(b) The notice may be registered prior to the
birth of the child but must be registered prior
to the date the illegitimate child is relinquished
or placed with an agency licensed to provide
adoption services or prior to the filing of a
petition by a person with whom the mother
has placed the child for adoption
(c) Any father of such child who fails to file
and register his notice of claim to paternity
and his agreement to support the child shall
be barred from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to establish his paternity of
the child. Such failure shall further constitute
an abandonment of said child and a waiver
and surrender of any right to notice of or to a
hearing in any judicial proceeding for the
adoption of said child, and the consent of such
father to the adoption of such child shall not
be required.
(Emphasis added.)
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rental rights is implemented through the
actor or actors who accept the child for
placement, whether a state entity, a private
licensed adoption agency, or any other person, for example an attorney. It would be
a total fiction to allow the state to remove
itself from its decision to cut off parental
rights simply because a private party triggers operation of the statute. The only
fair conclusion is that such a private party
becomes a "state actor" when his or her
actions bring the statute into play so as to
effectuate the pre-determined state decision to terminate parental rights.
This is not a case wherein state action
could be found because the legislation encouraged a private decision to discriminate.4 Also, it is not a case wherein the
decision of a private party to discriminate
based upon race or sex amounts to a state
decision because the private actor has some
"state" attributes or connection, such as
state funding or regulation.5 This case is
also distinguishable from the slippery slope
of private dispute resolution whereby a private party makes necessary use oi some
state procedure and thereafter is challenged as a "state actor*' for having deprived a plaintiff of liberty or property
based upon the state's involvement in cre4.

Defendants have cited several cases for the
proposition that when a private party acts pursuant to a state law, there is stale action only if
the state law authorizes conduct that was impermissible prior to the enactment. For example
in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 87 S.Ct.
1627, 18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1967) the Supreme Court
determined that an amendment to the California constitution permitting private discrimination in real estate transactions, which was previously prohibited by statute, constituted an official encouragement to the private decision to
discriminate, thereby transforming such private
decisions into state action. However, Reitman,
and the cases cited by defendants deal with a
completely different situation than is presented
here. In those cases the question was whether a
private decision may be attributed to the State
because it was encouraged by a state statute.
Here the statute in question increased rather
than decreased the rights of putative fathers
over what was recognized at common law. Accordingly, that statute would seem to have no
impact upon determination of the "state actor"
question.

5. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 VS. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961);

.

ating such procedure or in failing to create
other procedures. State action may not be
present in the categories of cases just mentioned because in those cases private parties, rather than the state, made the essential decision to attempt to deprive a plaintiff of his or her liberty or property interest.6
Another consideration which comes into
play in determining whether state action is
present is the distinction between property
interests and liberty interests. Unlike disputes involving property in which private
parties may agree to some allocation or
disposition without any state involvement,
oftentimes the liberty interest can only be
severed by the state. The distinction is
apparent in child custody-parental right
cases. Although a private party may deprive a parent of physical custody of his
child, only the state can irrevocably severe
all parental rights, which rights are recognized as being "far more previous than
property rights."7
This court considers that under the circumstances of this case the conduct by
private actors amounted to state action.
This conclusion follows from consideration
of the evident state mandated decision set
see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct.
2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982); Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 VS. 830, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 73 L.Ed.2d
418 (1982).
6. Compare, Flagg Brothers Inc. v. Brooks, 436
VS. 149, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978);
(no state action present) with Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 VS. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744,
73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) (state action present).
7. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758, 102
S.Ct. 1388, 1397, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). The
Supreme Court said of the state's power to terminate parental rights:
Lassiter declared it "plain beyond the need for
multiple citation" that a natural parent's "desire for and right to 'the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his or her children'" is an interest far more precious than
any property right . . . when the state initiates
a parental rights termination proceeding, it
seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental
liberty interest, but to end i t . . . . Few forms
of state action are both so severe and so irreversible.
Id. at 758-59, 102 S.Ct. at 1397 (emphasis added); see also discussion at footnote 2, supra.
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forth in the self operative statute, and is
supported by several factually specific
"tests" of the Supreme Court. Perhaps
most readily applicable is the "public function" test.8 In Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct 449, 42
L Ed 2d 477 (1974) the Court dealt with an
individual decision by a privately owned
utility company to terminate a plaintiffs
utility service without notice and hearing.
In Jackson the court stated:
Petitioner next urges that state action is
present because respondent provides an
essential public service required to be
supplied on a reasonably continuous basis ... and hence performs a "public
function." We have, of course, found
state action present in the exercise by a
private entity of powers traditionary exclusively reserved to the State. .. If
we were dealing with the exercise by
Metropolitan of some power delegated to
it by the State which is traditionally
associated with sovereignty, such as
eminent domain, our case would be
quite a different one.
8.

In Lugar the court commented on its prior
"tests" for attributing state action to otherwise
private actors
[The] "something more" which would convert
the private party into a state action might
vary with the circumstances of the case
[TJhe court has articulated a number of different factors or tests in different contexts
e g , the "public function" test
.; the "state
compulsion" test . , the "nexus" test
,
and, in the case of prejudgment attachments a
"joint action test" Whether these different
tests arc actually different in operation or
simply different ways of characterizing the
necessanl> fact-bound inquiry that confronts
the court in such a Situation need not be
resolved here
Although this court relies on the public function
test, that reliance is not to the exclusion of the
other Supreme Court tests. It is just that within
these facts the other tests seem to be encompassed by the public function test Nevertheless, the extensive regulation of private agencies
by Family Services also could be considered to
establish a sufficient "nexus" "State compulsion" and/or "joint actions" may also exist in
that the Utah statute "encourages" and "authorizes" the resultant termination of parental
rights when the private adoption agency chooses to take custody of the child Also, a symbiotic relationship exists between pnvate agencies
and the state because as defendants concede the
private agencies reduce the cost that would ncc
essarily have to be born by the st«itc to place

419 U.S. at 352-53, 95 S.Ct at 454 (emphasis added). In this case we are dealing
with a traditional function of the state.
This case involves the principle of parens
patriae (parent of the country) whereby
the sovereign is under the duty to act as
guardian for those under legal disability.
The State of Utah has an exclusive and
traditional duty to assure that a child
whose custody has been released to the
state by the natural mother will be placed
in the care of appropriate substitute parents. Although traditionally many pnvate
actors and family members voluntarily
have stepped into parental roles when natural parents have suffered a disability, that
voluntary conduct was not the result of a
legal duty The State of Utah is the sole
party with such duty. In furtherance of
that duty the state has undertaken to fulfill
its responsibility by automatic termination
of a father's parental rights, which is a
prerequisite to any adoption,9 and delegation of some of its responsibility to private
regulated adoption agencies in finding appropriate substitute parents.10
children if the pnvate entities were not engaged
in that function
9. See H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations,
§ 18 1 at 602 (1968) (adoption requires that the
legal rights and obligations of natural parents
Come to an end before similar rights and obligations can be vested in new adoptive parents)
10* Under Utah's statutory scheme, Family Services statutorily is required to prescribe rules
and regulations for the manner in which private
adoptive agencies arc organized financed and
administrated
Utah Code Ann. § 55-8a-4
(1986) Specifically Family Services prescribes
Standards for the employment and performance
Of private adoption agency employees Family
Services also writes rules and regulations covering the general standards of practice, the
records required to be kept, the use of homes to
receive and care for children received by the
agency and "any other matters deemed necessary to assure the competency and suitability of
Child placing agencies to place children " Id.
Family Services is required to investigate all
applicants for child placing agency status
| 55-8a-2 In addition, Family Services is also
granted the authority to conduct investigations
into agency compliance with its regulations
Once a license has been issued Finally, the
Statute authorizes Family Services to hold license revocation or suspension proceedings
Upon notice § 55-8a-3

l U l t

The conclusion we reach here that state
action is present should not create a chill
upon actions of private adoption agencies.
This court does not rule that all actions and
decisions by private adoption agencies will
be subject to review under the constitution.
Rather this court's holding is limited to the
role of LDS Social Services and other private parties in triggering the state mandated result of § 7&-30-4.11 Where as here
that role is limited as a conduit for the
implementation of prior state decisions and
policy it seems clear that no liability for
damages could attach.
[2] A final question is whether the absence of the state or some official thereof
as a named party presents a defect here.
We think not. The private parties and the
named state judge are the only parties
from whom requested injunctive relief
could be obtained if the statute were to be
declared unconstitutional.12 In focusing
upon the conduct that resulted in termi11. Accordingly, this court makes no finding of
state action with regard to plaintiffs claim for
damages against LDS Social Services. This
court's holding is limited to operation of the
statute and the plaintiffs request for return of
custody. Thai recognition is consistent with the
Utah Supreme Court's dicta in Sanchez v. LD.S.
Soda! Services, 680 P.2d 753, 755 n. 2 (Utah
1984) that a decision by L.D.S. Social Services
not to inform a putative father of his duty under
§ 78-30-4 is not state action as well as the
dissent in In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717
P.2d 686, 695 (Utah 1986) (Stewart, J. dissenting) that deception by the mother or other private parties as to when a child would be born is
not state action. See abo In the Matter of Petition of Steve B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 730 P.2d 942,
947 (1986) (deception of mother as to child's
custody was not state action).

nation of plaintiffs parental rights, only
three principal actors are involved: (1) the
child's mother who relinquished all custody
and control of the child; (2) LDS Social
Services who received custody of the child,
took applications from potential adoptive
parents and delivered custody to the adoptive parents; and (3) John and Jane Doe
who applied for adoption and received custody of the child from LDS Social Services.
This court holds that in a judicial proceeding by a putative father for determination
of his parental rights, the said actors
should be deemed to be state actors for the
limited purpose of challenging operation of
the statute. The Utah Supreme Court appears to agree and implicitly has recognized that operation of § 78-30-4 involves
state action in the context of a private
adoption, even when the state or its officials are not formally joined as parties.13
A similar recognition is found in cases from
other jurisdictions and the United States
Supreme Court.14 In addition, it is clear
of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986)
(allowing intervention by putative father in
adoption proceeding to raise constitutionality of
statute under Federal and State Constitutions);
In the Matter of K.B.E. and T.M.E, 740 P.2d 292
(Utah Ct.App.1987) (same).

14. See In re Adoption of Martz. 102 Misc.2d 1C2,
423 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1979), aff'd, In re Ad'i prion of
Jessica "XX", 11 A.D.2d 381. 434 N.Y.S.Id 772
(1980), aff'd. 54 N.Y.2d 417, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20,
430 N.E.2d 896 (1981), aff'd, Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614
(1983). In Lehr the State of New York was
allowed to intervene as a party but its presence
seemingly was not a factor in finding that the
conduct involved state action which could be
tested in that particular lawsuit. If the state's
ability to present argument is a factor in determining whether state action exists in this partic12. It would be of little benefit to name state
ular lawsuit, local rule of practice 6(b) is imporofficers such as the attorney general because
tant because the State of Utah has been notified
operation of the statute seemingly has no relaof the challenge to the statute here. At this
tionship to the responsibilities of such officials.
point the state has not sought intervention. See
13. See Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, also In re David Andrew, 56 A.D.2d 627, 391
N.Y.S.2d 846, aff'd, In re David A.C, 43 N.Y.2d
681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984) (suit against private
708, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208, 372 N.E.2d 42 (1977),
nonprofit adoption agency and the child's mothrev'd, Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99
er; reference in the editor's case summary to
S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) (appeal from
the defendant as a "state adoption agency" is
adoption proceeding involving father and adopincorrect); Sanchez v. LD.S. Social Services,
tive parents); In re: Application of Randall Wal680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984) (suil against private
cott for Adoption of Child, Adoption Case No.
nonprofit adoption agency); Ellis v. Social Ser8466, (Ga.Super.Ct. July 12, 1976), aff'd, 238 Ga.
vices Dept. of the Church of Jesus Christ of
230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977), aff'd, Quilloin v.
Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980)
Walcotl, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 LEd.2d
(suit against private nonprofit adoption agency
511 (1978) (appeal from adoption proceeding
and the child's mother). See also In re Adoption
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that the requirement of state action is the
same whether a case is brought m federal
or state court ,5 We conclude that plaintiff
has named the proper parties to test the
constitutionality of the alleged "state" deprivation,
II. Abstention
Defendants have requested that if this
court finds jurisdiction to exist, nevertheless it should abstain from hearing the case
and defer to the ongoing state adoption
proceedmg. In Colorado River Water
Consenatxon District v United States,
424 U.S. 800, 96 S Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483
(1976) the Supreme Court reviewed its prior
cases and discussed the propriety of abstention The court said:
Abstention from the exercise of federal
jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.
"The doctrine of abstention, under which
a District Court may decline to exercise
or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to
adjudicate a controversy properly before
it Abdication of the obligation to decide
cases can be justified under this doctrine
only in the exceptional circumstances
where the orde*- to the parties to repair

to the state court would clearly serve an
important countervailing interest.'* ...
Our decisions have confined the circumstances appropriate for abstention to
three several categories.
(a) Abstention is appropriate "m cases
presenting a federal constitutional issue
which might be mooted or presented m a
different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law."
[Texas v. Pullman Co, 312 U S. 496, 61
S.Ct 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941)]
(b) Abstention is also appropriate
whsre there have been presented difficult questions of state law bearing on
policy problems of substantial public impact whose importance transcends the
result in the case at bar. ... [Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux,
360 U.S. 25, 79 S.Ct. 1070, 3 L.Ed.2d 1058
(1959)]
(c) Finally; abstention is appropriate
where, absent bad faith, harassment, or
a patently invalid state statute, federal
jurisdiction has been invoked for th. purpose of restraining state cnminal proceedings, Younger [v. Harms, 401 U.S.
37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ld 2- 669 (1971)]
... state nuisance proceedings antecedent to a criminal prosecution, \vhich

invoking father and adoptive parents) In Quil>
custody of the child If he is fit he must
lion the state appeared as amicus curiae before
prevail.
the Georgia Supreme Coun See also In re the
The court remanded for a factual determination
involving the previously joined parties See also
Matter of Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga 292, 358
In the Matter of the Petition of Ste\e BD, 112
S E 2d 459 (1987) In Eason the putative father
Idaho 22, 730 PJd 942 (1986) (proceeding inf Jed a petition for legitimation of his biological
volving the prospective adoptive parents and
child which was objected to by the child s moth
natural father; court reached federal constituer, a child placement agency and prospective
tional question)
adoptive parents The Georgia Supreme Court
reached the federal constitutional question
15. In Lugar the United States Supreme Court
raised 2nd $2)6
said
But the relation
TC between adopting
If fc defendant debtor in state-court debt colparents and chik J*d not take place in the
lection proceedings can successfully chal
absence of state participation The adoption
lenge, on federal due process grounds, the
laws were being pursued through the courts
plaintiff creditor's resort to the procedures
and this accounts for the placement of the
authorized by a state statute, it is difficult to
child with the adopting parents The unwed
understand whv that same behavior by the
father has a constitutionally protected interest
state-court plaintiff should not provide a
which cannot be denied him through state
cause of action under § 1983 If the creditoraction Only the state can alter us decision to
plaintiff violates the debtor defendant s due
prevent the development of a parent child re
process rights by seizing his propert) in ac
cordance with statutory procedures, there is
lationship with adopting parents until the
lutlc or no reason to den> to the latter a cause
unwed father's rights are resolved Thus we
of action under the federal statute, § 1983
conclude if Scharlach has not abandoned his
designed to provide judicial redress for just
opportunity interest, the standard which must
such constitutional violations
be used to determine his right to legitimate
457 U.S at 934, 102 S Ct at 2752
the child is his fitness as a parent to have
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are directed at obtaining the closure of
places exhibiting obscene films, Huffman [v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95
S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975)] ... or
collection of state taxes.
Id. at 813-816, 96 S.Ct. at 1244-46.
[3] After careful consideration, this
court has determined that it is appropriate
to exercise discretion by requiring resolution by the state courts of the questions
here presented This court is persuaded
that this case falls within one or more of
the exceptions explained in Colorado River
Water Conservation District as well as
the longstanding practice of abstention in
domestic relations matters.

Supreme Court precedent dealing with the
jurisdiction of federal district courts. In In
re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 10 S.Ct. 850, 34
L.Ed. 500 (1890) the court said:
The whole subject of the domestic rela
tions of husband and wife, parent and
child, belongs to the laws of the States
and not to the laws of the United States
As to the right to the control and possession of this child, as it is contested by its
father and its grandfather, it is one in
regard to which neither the Congress of
the United States nor any authority of
the United States has any special juris
diction.
Id. at 593-94, 10 S.Ct. at 853. Later authority has recognized that the theoretical
A. Pullman Abstention
underpinnings of such Supreme Court recWith regard to the category of absten- ognition is not complete lack of jurisdiction
tion involving possible mooting of the fed- but rather strong policies of federal-state
eral constitutional question, the Utah Su- comity. See Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586
preme Court's opinion in Wells v. Chil- F.2d 625, 632 (6th Cir.1978). Accordingly,
dren 's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 federal courts ordinarily should defer to
(Utah 1984) is important. In that case the the state courts based upon the state's
Utah court reviewed the Supreme Court's strong interest in domestic relations matopinions in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. ters, the superior expertise of state courts
645, 92 S Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) in settling such disputes and the possibility
and in Le.urv. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 of incompatible state and federal orders
S.Ct. 2985, 77 LEd2d 614 (1983). The See Fay v. South Colonie Central School
court then turned to the Utah Constitution DisL, 802 F.2d 21, 31 (2nd Cir 1986), Peterand determined that under the Utah Consti- son v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir
tution a putative father receives greater 1983), Magaziner v M^ntemuro, 46S F2d
protection than was granted by the Su- 782, 787 (3rd Cir.1972) Based upon the
preme Court in Lehr under the federal above policies, courts have been reluctant
constitution. Id. 681 P.2d at 206. Based to get into custody disputes wherein priupon that recognition plaintiff may be able vate parties contest what is in the best
to establish that as applied the Utah stat- interest of a child. See Coats v Woods,
ute is violative of the greater protections of 819 F2d 236, 237 (9th Cir 1987); Peterson
the state constitution, thereby mooting the v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir 19S3);
LaMontagne v. LaMontagne, 394 F.Supp
federal constitutional question.
1159, 1160 (D.Mass.1975)
B. Thibodaux Abstention
Admittedly this case goes beyond a mere
private
dispute over the best interests of a
This case also presents important questions of state law that bear upon policy child and goes to the heart of Utah's statuissues of considerable importance to the tory scheme. Plaintiff correctly points out
State of Utah. The importance of the state that the Utah Supreme Court has upheld
1
interests in this case are born out by early the facial validity of § 78-30-4. * How16. In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686,
689 (Utah 1986), Wells v. Children's Aid Society
of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 206 (Utah 1984). Sanchez
v. LD S Social Sendees, 680 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah
1984), Ellis v. Social Services Dept. of the

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615
P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980) Plaintiff here con
tends that the most recent opinion, In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, so si uficantl} alters the
operation of the statute that it amounts to a
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ever, the Supreme Court of Utah has defined an "impossibility" exception to the
statute, and there is considerable reason to
believe the Utah courts are interpreting
§ 78-30-4 in a way that will meet the federal constitutional questions raised here.17
The state's interests at stake here> are
great, and the Utah courts have evidenced
a willingness to balance the interests of
putative fathers in individual cases within
the purview of a constitutional statute.
This court considers that the Utah courts
they ought to be given further opportunity
to do so. In Moore v Sims, 442 U S 415,
99 SCt 2371, 60 LEd.2d 994 (1979) the
Supnjme Court recognized as much.
facial attack on the statute. At least one commentator agrees See Note, Termination of an
Un^ed Fathers Parental Rights, 1987 Utah
L Re\ 220, 221 For other commentary on the
In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe case see L
Wardle, The Adoption Conundrum Part I, 1987
Utah Lawyer Alert No 4 at 4-8, L Wardle, The
Adoption Conundrum Part II, 1987 Utah Lawyer
Alert No 5 at 6-9, Note, The Putatne Fathers'
Due Process Rights to Notice and a Hearing In
re Baby Boy Doe, 1986 B Y U L.Re\ 1081.
17. In Ellis the Utah Supreme Court first defined
an impossibility exceptio u r - *- § 78-30-4.
The court said that if it was "impossible for the
father to file the required notice of paternity
prior to the statutory bar, through no fault of his
own
and he came forward w» hm a reasonable time after the baby's birth he should be
deemed to have complied with the statute " 615
F 2d at 1256 (emphasis added) In its most
recent interpretation of the impossibilitv exception the Supreme Court overruled a specific
finding of fact by the trial court that it was not
"impossible" for the father to have complied
with § 78-30-4 In so doing the court engaged
in a factually specific analysis of the operation
of the statute in terms of fairness to the particular father involved. The Utah Supreme Court
said
[T]he standards enunciated in [our] cases
were developed in recognition of the need to
balance the competing interests in this type of
case, the significant state interest in speedily
placing infants for adoption and the constitutionally protected rights of putative fathers
See Wells, 681 P.2d at 202-03. In all but the
most exceptional cases, the operation of section 78-3-04 achieves that balance as it af
fords putative fathers the opportunity to assert and protect their rights while providing a
finite point at which the state's interest supercedes that of the father However, where a
father docs not know of the need to protect
his rights, there is no "reasonable opportuni
ty" to assert or protect parental rights In

The final concern prompted by broad facial attacks on state statutes is the
threat to our federal system of government posed by "the needless obstruction
to the domestic policy of the states by
forestalling state action in construing
and applying its own statutes."
State courts are the principal expositors
of state law. Almost every constitutional challenge—-and particularly one
as far ranging as that involved in this
case—offers the opportunity for narrowing constructions that might obviate the constitutional problem and insuch a case, the operation of the statute fails
to achieve the desired balance and raises serious due process concerns Although we have
previously established that actual notice is not
required prior to termination of parental
rights under section 7&-3Q-4(3), Wells, 681
P.2d at 207, that determination was based at
least in part on the assumption that "[n]otice
requirements ma\ be satisfied when necessarily implied/' Ellis, 615 P.2d at 1256, n 16
(citation omitted), 1 e , in the usual case where
the putative father knows or should know of
the birth and can reasonably take the timely
action required to avoid the statutory bar.
Under the circumstances of this case, however, including the clearly articulated intent
of the father to keep and rear the child, the
full knowledge of that intent on the part of all
involved, the representations made b> the
mother, the actions of her famil>, the premature birth, and the non-residency of the father
coupled with his absence at the time of birth
we cannot say that this was either a usual
case or that notice mav be implied We there
fore conclude that appellant has successfully
shown "that the termination of his parental
rights was contrary to basic notions of due
process, and that he came forward within a
reasonable time after the baby's birth, [such
that] he should be deemed to have complied
with the statute " In re Adoption of Baby Boy
Doe, 111 P.2d at 691
In an even more recent opinion the Utah Court
of Appeals found a remand unnecessary to determine impossibility where a putative father
filed a notice of paternity hours after a petition
for adoption was filed The court acknowledged that the father failed timely to file in
accordance with the statute but held that in the
circumstances application of the statute's bar
would violate fundamental fairness In the
Matter of K.B.E and T M E, 740 P.2d 292, 29697 (Utah Ct App 1987) The court engaged in a
balancing analysis apparently independent of a
determination of impossibility.

tclligcntly mediate federal constitutional concerns and state interest.
When federal courts disrupt that process
of mediation while interjecting themselves in such disputes, they prevent the
informed evolution of state policy by
state tribunals
The price exacted in
terms of comity would only be outweighed if state courts were not competent to adjudicate federal constitutional
claims—a postulate we have repeatedly
and emphatically rejected.
In sum, the only pertinent inquiry is
whether the state proceedings afford an
adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims and Texas law appears to
raise no procedural barriers.
Id. at 430, 99 S.Ct. at 2380-81.
Under all of the circumstances this court
is persuaded that under the doctrine of
Thibodaux it should defer to the state
courts to allow them to fulfill their duty to
further Utah's policy in balancing the competing interests in adoption cases consistent with federal constitutional principles.
C. Younger Abstention
Under the Younger abstention doctrine a
ftderal court will not grant injunctive or
u,claratory relief if the federal plaintiff is
a party to a state criminal proceeding and
the party can raise the constitutional issue
in the state proceeding. Younger has been
extended by the Supreme Court to civil
contexts when the state is a party to a civil
proceeding and the action is in aid of and
closely related to criminal statutes. Sec
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 99 S.Ct. 2371,
18. Some courts do not require that the State be
a direct part> so long as significant state interests are involved Under that view the state
adoption proceeding would seem to meet the
test This is an unsettled area of the lau, however. See Ethn v Robb, 458 U.S 1112, 102 S.Ct.
3496, 73 L.Ed.2d 1375 (1962) (White, J dissentmg from denial of certiorari, joined by Brennan, J. on basis that whether Younger applies to
a private dispute (in Robb a custody dispute) is
a question that needs to be finally resolved by
the Supreme Court).
19. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d
686 (Utah 1986), Ellis v. Social Ser\'iccs of the

60 L Ed.2d 994 (1979; (involving state slat
ute authorizing temporary removal of child
in child abuse context). In this case plain
tiff seeks to enjoin the ongoing adoption
proceeding and thus Younger fs recognized
policy of noninterference applies. However, application of Younger to the facts of
this case would require extension of the
principle in two respects: (1) here the plaintiff in the federal proceeding is not a party
to the ongoing adoption proceeding; and (2i
the State of Utah is not a directly named
party in the adoption proceeding.18 Accordingly, this court finds it unnecessary to
rely on Younger abstention because we
have found that Thibodaux abstention here
applies.
Despite nonreliance on Younger, this
court recognizes that for any principle *'
abstention to apply it is necessary that the
plaintiff have an avenue available in state
court. In this case the statute, § 78-3Q-4
provides that plaintiff's failure to file a
notice of paternity prior to the time his
child was placed with L.D.S Social Services
bars him "from thereafter bringing or
maintaining any action to establish his pa
ternity of the child." However, defendants
point out that through intervention in the
adoption proceeding or through filing a ha
beas corpus petition putative fathers have
obtained state court review of the constitu
tionality of § 78-30-4 as applied to them »
The court also notes that ultimate recourse
to federal court from an adverse state
court decision is not cut off20 In a!!
events, this court in finding abstention to
be appropriate assumes that plaintiff will
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615
P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), In the Matter of KBE
and T.M.E, 740 P.2d 292 (Utah CLApp 19S7)
20. If plaintiff challenges § 78-30-4 in state
court and the court upholds the statute, plaintiff
will have a right of appeal to the United States
Supreme Court See 28 U.S C § 1257(2). The
Court's appellate jurisdiction is nondiscretion
ary although the Court need not give the case
plenary review See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U S
332. 343-44, 95 S Ct. 2281, 2289, 45 LEd 2d 223
(1975).
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have an adequate opportunity for review in
state court.21
Based upon the above analysis, plaintiffs
motion for preliminary injunction is denied
and defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted without prejudice to resolution of the
matter in the state courts of Utah. This
Memorandum Decision and Order will suf
fice as the court's final action on this motion; no further Order need be prepared by
counsel.

CONNECTICUT SAVINGS BANK, Heritage Savings and Loan Association,
et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
SAVERS FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION and Cushman
and Wakefield of Pennsylvania, Inc.
a/k/a Cushman and Wakefield Appraisal Division, Defendants.
SAVERS FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, Third-Party
Plaintiff,

third-party claim against appraisers, and
appraisers removed action from state to
federal district court. Original plaintiffs
and third-party plaintiffs moved to remand.
The District Court, Aronovitz, J., held that
third-party action was improvidently removed.
Motion granted.

1 Removal of Cases e=>56
Under removal statute, third-party
claim is "separate and independent" from
claims raised in main action if it is susceptible of adjudication separate and apart from
claims raised in main action. 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1441(c).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

2. Removal of Cases <s=56
Third-party action filed by permanent
financiers against appraisers allegedly responsible for financier's breach of loan purchase agreement was improvidently removed to federal district court; financiers'
third-party claims were not "separate and
independent" from breach of contract
claims raised in main action. 2S U.S.C.A.
§ 1441(c).

v.
CI1 Y FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION and Cushman and
Wakefield of Pennsylvania, Inc. a/k/a
Cushman and Wakefield Appraisal Division, Third-Party Defendants.
No. 86-12002-Civ.

Alice Blackwell White, Broad and Cassel,
Maitland, Fla., O.H. Storey, III, Hoover.
Jacobs & Storey, Little Rock, Ark., Robert
E. Doyle, Asbell, Hains, Doyle & Pickworth, Naples, Fla., for Savers Federal
Sav. and Loan Ass'n.

April 16, 1987.

Leigh E. Dunston, Gunster, Yoakley,
Criser & Stewart, P.A.. West Palm Beach,
Fla., George Vega, Jr., Vega, Brown, Nichols, Stanley & Martin, Naples, Fla., for City
Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n.

Action was brought against permanent
financiers for their alleged breach of loan
purchase agreement.
Financiers filed

Leo J. Salvatori, Quarles & Brady, Naples, Fla., Gary R. Battistoni, Drinker, Biddie & Reath, Philadelphia, Pa., for Solamar
Venture, Ltd.

United States District Court,
S.D. Florida,
Miami Division.

21. If after diligent effort b\ plaintiff, and cooperation from the defendants, plaintiff is unable
to obtain review in the state courts of Utah this
court will be required to exercise i s junsdic-

tion See Louisiana Power & Light Co v. Thibo>
daux, 360 U.S 25, 30-31, 79 S Ct 1070, 3
L.Ld.2d 1058 (1959).
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In the Matter of the Adoption of
T.R.F., a Minor,
•.

Raj FELAN, Appellant
No. 870307-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Aug. 30, 1988.
Natural father appealed from order of
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
James S. Sawaya, J., terminating father's
parental rights and authorizing nonrelated
third parties to proceed with adoption of
child. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J.,
held that (1) father had acknowledged
child as his own and thereby legitimated
child; (2) father was not required to file
notice of paternity; and (3) termination of
father's parental rights was unconstitutional.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Children Out-of-Wedlock <*=»12
To legitimate child, acknowledgment
statute requires unwed father to publicly
acknowledge child, receive child into father's family and treat child as legitimate.
U.C.A.1953, 78-30-12.
2. Children Out-of-Wedlock <*=>12
Natural father had "acknowledged his
child" and thereby "legitimated child" pursuant to acknowledgment statute before
petition for adoption was filed, where father received chOd into his home for brief
visits and on an occasion child would spend
night, father temporarily resided with child
and child's mother, and when possible, father visited the child at child's mothers
home, took child to Texas to meet his own
family, and held child out to public and to
his family as his own. U.C.A.1953, 78-3012.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Adoption «=»7.2(1)
Any filing of petition for adoption after unwed father has acknowledged child

and only natural mother has consented to
adoption is legal nullity.
4. Children Out-of-Wedlock *»12
To maintain his paternal right established by compliance with express terms of
acknowledgment statute, natural father
was not required, in addition, to file notice
of paternity. U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4(3Xb),
78-30-12.
5. Infants «=>155, 156, 157
Parental rights cannot be terminated
by merely applying best interests of child
standard, but rather, there must be showing of parent's unfitness, abandonment, or
substantial neglect
6. Constitutional Law <*=>274(5)
Infants <*=»155
Depriving natural father of his parental rights based upon best interest of child
despite fact that father was found to have
relationship with child and to be fit and
proper parent, was unconstitutional violation of father's due process rights. U.S.
C.A. ConstAmend. 14.

Jane Allen (argued), Salt Lake City, for
appellant
Bart J. Bailey (argued), Bailey & Nelson,
Midvale, for T.R.F.
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and
DAVIDSON, JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
This is an appeal from an order which
permanently terminated appellant Ray Felan's parental nghts and authorized the petitioners to proceed with the adoption of his
child. The trial court found that Felan,
prior to the fihng of petitioners' petition for
adoption, had adopted his child by acknowledgment pursuant to Utah Code
§ 78-30-12 (1987), and that he was a fit
and proper person to have custody of his
child. Nevertheless, the trial court permanently terminated Felan's parental rights.
The court based its decision on Felan's

T.RJ. v. FELAN
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failure to file a notice of paternity under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3<M(3Xb) (1987), before the petitioners filed their petition for
adoption, and on the "best interests" of the
child. We reverse and remand.
Appellate review of a trial court's termination of parental rights is highly fact sensitive. Consequently, we review the facts
of this dispute in detail. Felan's child was
born on October 30,1980, in Salt Lake City,
Utah. Felan was stationed in Japan with
the United States Marine Corps at the time
of the child's birth. Felan and the child's
mother were not married at the time of
conception, nor did they marry after the
child's birth. Felan is named as the child's
father on the birth certificate and the child
was given his surname. He is also identified as the child's father on the child's
baptismal record.
Felan and the child's mother discussed
marriage and having a child before the
child was conceived. However, Felan at
the time was married to another woman.1
Felan purchased baby furniture for his
child, including a crib, a playpen, a highchair, a rocker, and clothing, costing roughly $1200. When the child was about sixweeks old, the child's mother took the child
to visit Felan in Japan for approximately
two weeks. Felan and the child's mother
remained in contact during his stay in Japan. When the child was one and one-half
years of age, Felan was transferred to
Twenty-nine Palms, California. While stationed at Twenty-nine Palms, according to
the child's mother, "[Felan] would come [to
Salt Lake City] often or I would go down
there." The child's mother's job entailed
traveling and she worked in Anaheim, California "a couple of times so that [Felan]
could see [the child] and we could be together." During one of these visits, Felan
had the child by himself for roughly a week
while the mother attended business meetings. According to Felan, the relationship
he had with the child's mother was like any
other "military family." That is, they
would see each other when they could,
planning visits around where Felan was
stationed. After his term in Twenty-nine
1. Felan was subsequently divorced in August
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Palms, Felan was discharged from the military after twenty-three and one-half years
of service.
In August 1983, after he was discharged,
Felan returned to Salt Lake City where he
resided with the child's mother and the
child until December 1983. Thereafter, he
moved to Austin, Texas where his parents
and other relatives lived, to seek employment The child's mother and the child
went to visit Felan in Austin to celebrate
the child's third birthday. It was important to both Felan and the child's mother
that the child know Felan's relatives.
In January 1984, Felan accepted a position with the United States Postal Service
and returned to Salt Lake City. Felan
lived with the child's mother and their child
from the end of January 1984 until May
1984 in the mother's rented house. Thereafter, Felan put a $15,000 down payment
on a house where the child's mother, their
child, and her other children resided. After
Felan allegedly physically and emotionally
abused the child's mother, the couple's relationship deteriorated. In December 1984
the mother, along with all of her children,
moved out of Felan's home.
It is unclear from the record how often
Felan visited his child after his separation
from the mother. At first, the child's
mother admits she did not tell Felan where
she lived. Felan claims he accidentally discovered the residence of his child. Felan
claims he thereafter saw the child's mother
on a regular basis. Eventually he stopped
seeing the mother, but he continued to see
the child. According to the child's mother,
Felan visited the child twice a month for
two to three hours each time, and occasionally he would take the child on overnight
visits to his home. Felan also took the
child on extended trips by himself. For
example, he took the child to Texas on two
occasions and once took her to Las Vegas.
Indeed, Felan took the child to visit his
family in Texas for 22 days in August 1985,
just five months before the petition to
adopt was filed. Furthermore, Felan, the
child's mother, and their child had a "family" picture taken in late December 1985,
1982.

just one month before the child's mother
secretly consented to the child's adoption
by the petitioners.
The trial judge found Felan had not provided his child with adequate financial support Although at trial Felan produced
cancelled checks made out to the child's
mother totaling over $2,500, he never made
regular child support payments. The
child's mother never filed an action to enforce Felan's legal obligation to support
the child. Felan did buy the child a bicycle
and other items during the child's visits
with him.

of his beneficiaries. The child is currently
covered by Felan's medical insurance. The
trial court specifically found that Felan satisfied the requirements delineated in section 78-30-12, Utah's acknowledgment
statute:
[Felan] by his actions has acknowledged
that he is the natural father of [the child]
and has acknowledged his paternity by
residing with [the child's mother] and the
child for extended periods of time and by
allowing his name to be placed on the
birth and baptismal certificates of the
child indicating that he is the father of
[the child]; and by further acknowledging to his own family and holding
[the child] out to them as his child.

The mother underwent a mastectomy in
May 1985. As a result of the mother's
health, the petitioners began tending the
child in August 1985. Further cancer was
discovered in September 1985. The petitioners took physical custody of the child in
January 1986. When the petitioners had
custody, Felan's requests to see his child
were often refused. When the petitioners
learned the mother was terminally ill, they
asked to adopt the child and the mother
consented. On January 7, 1986, the petitioners filed a verified petition to adopt the
child. Shortly thereafter, the mother filed
her consent Felan did not know of the
mother's intention to relinquish the child
for adoption nor of petitioners' desire to
adopt his child until after the petition for
adoption had been filed and after the
child's mother's death.2 Felan filed his acknowledgment of paternity the day after
he learned of the petition for adoption.
Felan insists the child's mother led him to
believe he would be allowed to rear the
child upon her death.
On September 17,1986, Felan applied for
a military identification card for the child,
which entitles the child to military benefits
such as commissary privileges, dental,
health, and death benefits. Felan's employment records identify the child as one

Thus, after finding that Felan had
adopted the child by acknowledgment, that
he held her out as his child, that he lived
with the child and the child's mother for
extended periods of time, and that Felan
was a fit and proper person to have custody of the child and had developed a relationship with the child, the court, nevertheless, permanently terminated Felan's parental rights and allowed petitioners to proceed with their petition for adoption. The
court based its decision on Felan's failure
to file a notice of paternity before the
petitioners filed their petition for adoption,
and because the court believed such placement would be in the "best interests" of
the child.8

2. The trial court found that Felan was unaware
of the peution for adoption or the mother's
consent thereto:
[Felan] was unaware of and ignorant of the
fact that a Petition for Adoption had been
Bled by the petitioners and [that the child's
mother] had given her consent to said adop-

tion. He did not become aware of those facts
until after the death of [the child's mother].
3, We are also troubled by the trial court's treatment of Felan, the child's natural father,
throughout this procedurally protracted case.
Felan, upon learning of the pending adoption
proceedings, immediately filed an objection to

The trial court also found Felan to be a
fit and proper parent
Each of the parties including petitioners
and [Felan] are found to be by the court
fit and proper persons to have custody of
and to adopt [the child]; however, the
petitioners and [the child] have developed
a psychological relationship and bond
which seems to the court to transcend
the relationship which existed between
[Felan] and [the child].
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I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The pivotal question presented to this
court concerns the proper interpretation of
two statutes, namely the acknowledgment
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-12 (1987),
and the paternity statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 7&-30-4 (1987). This is a question of law
and, therefore, we apply a correction-of-error standard with no particular deference
accorded the trial court's construction.
Traylor Bros., Inc/Frunin-Colnon
v.
Overton, 736 P.2d 1048,1050 (Utah CtApp.
1987). However, on appeal, we will not
disturb the trial court's factual findings
unless they are "clearly erroneous." Utah
R.Civ.P. 52(a). The "clearly erroneous"
standard, established by Rule 52(a), requires "that if the findings . . . are against
t i e clear weight of the evidence, or if the
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made, the findings . . . will be set aside."
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah
1987). The Utah Supreme Court, quoting
C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
And Procedure § 2585 (1971), stated:
The appellate court . . . does not consider
and weigh the evidence de novo. The
mere fact that on the same evidence the
appellate court might have reached a different result does not justify it in setting
the findings aside. It may regard a finding as clearly erroneous only i/the finding is without adequate evidentiary support or induced by an erroneous view of
the law.
Id. at 193 (emphasis added).

term used in the statute was used advisedly." Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244, 247
(Utah Ct App.1987). Therefore, we interpret and apply the statute in accordance
with its literal wording unless it is unreasonably confused or inoperable. Id.
It is presumed the Legislature intends to
achieve a consistent body of law. 1A C.
Sands, Sutherland Statutory
Construction § 23.09, at 332 (4th ed. 1985). Thus,
statutes relating to the same subject matter "should be construed with reference to
each other and harmonized, if possible," so
that effect is given to every provision of
the statutory scheme. Murray City v.
Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983).
Utah's acknowledgment statute, codified
at Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-12 (1987), provides, with our emphasis added:
The father of an illegitimate child, by
publicly acknowledging it as his own,
receiving it as such with the consent of
his wife, if he is married, into his family,
and otherwise treating it as if it were a
legitimate child, thereby adopts it as
such, and such child is thereupon
deemed for all purposes
legitimate
from the time of its birth. The foregoing provisions of this chapter do not
apply to such an adoption.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The cardinal rule in interpreting legislative enactments is "to assume that each

[1] In order to legitimate a child, the
acknowledgment statute requires an unwed
father to fulfill the following requirements:
"(1) public acknowledgment by the father,
(2) receipt of the child into the father's
family and (3) treatment of the child as
legitimate." Slade v. Dennis^ 594 P.2d
898, 900 (Utah 1979). Utah's acknowledgment statute and similar statutes in other
jurisdictions "have historically been given
liberal construction because of the law's

the petition for adoption. Fclan sought an evidentiary hearing to determine permanent custody and to determine visitation privileges with
his child while this case was pending. The trial
court denied each of Felan's requests. Felan
appealed this disposition to the Utah Supreme
Court. On November 3, 1986, the supreme
court granted Felan's request and remanded the
case for a "hearing on the law and the facts."
This evidentiary hearing was held on February
5, 1987, and was continued, per the parties'

stipulation, on May 12 and 13, 1987. While this
litigation was pending, the trial court continued
to refuse Felan visitation with his child even
though he had exercised visitation privileges
with his child the child's entire life. This denial
is problematic since the court had yet to decide
who would have permanent custody of the child
and it would seem in the child's best interests to
maintain a relationship with her natural father
until his parental rights were finally determined.
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strong policy in favor of legitimation." Id
at 899.
Courts in other jurisdictions, in interpreting statutes similar to [s]ection 78-30-12,
have generally given liberal construction
to these statutes in finding that the father has received the child into his family. It has generally been held that a
father can satisfy the receiving requirement by accepting the child into his home
for occasional brief visits. Further,
some courts have not been insistent that
the child actually be physically present in
the father's home. The receiving requirement has also been met where the
father temporarily resides with the mother and child, even for a very brief period.
A father's custom of visiting the child at
the mother's home has also been deemed
sufficient
Id at 900 (citations omitted).
[2] Based upon the foregoing authority,
the trial court was justified in finding that
Felan had acknowledged his child and
thereby legitimated the child pursuant to
the acknowledgment statute before the petition for adoption was filed. Felan received the child into his home for brief
visits and on occasion his child would spend
the night Felan temporarily resided with
the child and the child's mother. When
possible, Felan also visited the child at the
child's mother's home. Felan took the
child to Texas to meet his family. He held
the child out to the public and to his family
as his own.
[3] By its express wording, the acknowledgment statute provides the child is
adopted and deemed legitimate from birth
if the putative father has met the enumerated statutory requirements. Thus, any
filing of a petition for adoption after an
unwed father has met the statutory requirements, and with only the natural
mother's consent, is a legal nullity. The
father's consent is also required. To underscore this intention, the Legislature expressly states in the acknowledgment statute "that the other provisions of this chapter," i.e., the paternity statute, "do not
apply to such an adoption."

[4] The trial court, however, held that
in order to maintain his parental rights
established by compliance with the express
terms of the acknowledgment statute, Felan must, in addition to the enumerated
requirements, file a notice of paternity.
We do not read the statutory scheme as
mandating such a requirement Rather,
we harmonize the acknowledgment and paternity statutes by applying each according
to its own wording and in the factual context each was intended to apply.
The relevant provision of the paternity
statute, codified at Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-30-4(3Xb) (1987), provides in part:
The notice may be registered prior to the
birth of the child but must be registered
prior to the date the illegitimate child is
relinquished or placed with an agency
licensed to provide adoption services or
prior to the filing of a petition by a
person with whom the mother has placed
the child for adoption.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the
interplay between the acknowledgment
statute and the paternity statute in Ellis v.
Social Servs. Dep't of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 615 P.2d
1250 (Utah 1980). In Ellis, the putative
father claimed that by notifying the adoption agency of his paternity, by filing a
notice of paternity, and by filing his writ of
habeus corpus after the petition for adoption had been filed, he publicly acknowledged and thereby legitimated his child
within the meaning of the acknowledgment
statute. In Ellis, the Utah Supreme Court
held the putative father had not acted time
ly in filing his notice of paternity. Ellis,
615 P.2d at 1254.
Ellis is factually distinguishable from
the instant case as the acts claimed by the
putative father in Ellis were not sufficient
to satisfy the enumerated conditions in the
acknowledgment statute.
Furthermore,
the language relied on by petitioners to
support their position that the paternity
statute has been grafted onto the acknowledgment statute must be interpreted in
light of those facts. The pivotal factual
distinction between Ellis and this case is
the timing of the putative father's acts,
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Le., whether the father's acts satisfying the
acknowledgment statute occurred before or
after a petition for adoption has been filed.
It is this distinction which allows Ellis to
be read as harmonizing the acknowledgment and the paternity statutes.
The troublesome language of Ellis is as
follows:
In State in Interest of M [25 Utah 2d
101, 476 P.2d 1013 (1970)], this Court
upheld the express provisions of the [acknowledgment] statute and ruled that
the putative father's right to custody of
his illegitimate child is superior to all
others, except the child's mother. However, in 1975, the legislature enacted a
statute which effectively limited the time
in which the putative father may assert
those rights [the rights to legitimate the
child under the acknowledgment statute]
where the mother has relinquished her
rights to the child.
Therefore, whenever the natural mother
relinquishes custody of the child either to
an agency or to an individual for purposes of adoption, in order to protect his
rights under [the acknowledgment statute], the putative father must file a notice of paternity with the Bureau.
Where he fails timely to act [i.e., previously legitimate the child under the acknowledgment statute, or file notice of
paternity before the filing of the petition
for adoption], he 'shall be barred from
thereafter bringing or maintaining any
action to establish his paternity of the
child.'
Id. at 1253-54 (footnotes omitted). The
supreme court concluded that the putative
father's acts were not timely because he
had not complied with either the paternity
statute or the acknowledgment statute before the petition for adoption was filed.
Every act the putative father claimed was
sufficient to legitimate or acknowledge his
child was done after the petition for adoption had been filed.
The language of Ellis need not be read,
and indeed cannot constitutionally be read,
to require a putative father to file a notice
of paternity prior to the filing of the peti-

tion for adoption in a case such as this
where the putative father has previously
acknowledged the child within the meaning
of the acknowledgment statute. To read
Ellis to the contrary contradicts the express language of the acknowledgment
statute, which states that other sections of
the chapter, i.e., the paternity statute, do
not apply to acknowledgment adoptions
and that the child is deemed legitimate
from birth.
Furthermore, to interpret the interplay
between the acknowledgment statute and
the paternity statute otherwise would be
unconstitutional, as admitted by the supreme court in Ellis where the court
states:
In [Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
99 S.Ct 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) ] the
unwed father appealed from decisions of
the New York state courts which allowed
his children to be adopted by their natural mother and her present husband
without his consent and against his
wishes. The natural father had previously resided with the mother and had
contributed to the children's support
for a number of years, appeared as the
father on their birth certificates, and
maintained consistent contact with the
children after separating from the
mother. The United States Supreme
Court held that under such circumstances, the permitting of unwed mothers, but not unwed fathers, to veto
adoption of a child by withholding consent violated the Equal Protection
Clause.
The problem present in Caban is obviated in this jurisdiction by the provisions of
[the
acknowledgment
statute]
Where the father of an illegitimate
child complies with the provisions of
that statute, his rights with respect to
the child are as though the child was
born legitimate.
Id. at 1255 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
added).
In the instant case, where the trial court
specifically found that Felan, the unwed
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father, had previously taken affirmative
steps which satisfied the requirements of
the acknowledgment statute, thereby legitimating his child before the mother relinquished the child and before the petition for
adoption had been filed, our supreme court
cautions that the unwed father's failure to
file a notice of paternity is not fatal
There is no basis for the trial court's
conclusion that Felan's failure to file a
notice of paternity before petitioners filed
their petition for adoption was sufficient to
terminate his parental rights after he had
already legitimated his child by acknowledgment The acknowledgment statute
and the paternity statute can be harmonized to allow both to operate independently
in the appropriate factual contexts. Where
the acts which satisfy the requirements of
the acknowledgment statute have not been
undertaken prior to the relinquishment of
the child or prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, then the putative father's
failure to file a notice of paternity does
defeat the father's right to claim the child.
However, if the acts satisfying the acknowledgment statute are accomplished
prior to the mother's relinquishment or prior to the filing of the petition for adoption,
then the paternity statute is not applicable
because the child is deemed legitimate from
birth under the acknowledgment statute.
The paternity statute is intended to apply
to illegitimate children. This protects both
the unwed father's constitutional rights
and the important public policy of allowing
speedy adoption of infants.
III.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Our construction of the interplay between the acknowledgment statute and the
paternity statute allows the statutory
scheme to pass constitutional muster. An
unwed father's constitutional rights to his
child are a function of his relationship with
his child. Our supreme court, relying on
decisions by the United States Supreme
Court, e.g.t Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 92 S.Ct 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct.
549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978), has attempted

to articulate the scale of protection accorded unwed fathers by stating that
[P]arents in different circumstances are
apparently entitled to different degrees
of protection for their parental rights.
Parental rights are at their apex for parents who are married. Some variation
exists among unwed fathers. While
those who have fulfilled a parental role
over a considerable period of time are
entitled to a high degree of protection,
unwed fathers whose relationships to
their children are merely biological or
very attenuated may, in some circumstances, be deprived of their parental
status merely on the basis of the finding
of the "best interest" of the child.
In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1374-75 (Utah
1982) (citations omitted). See Wells v.
Children's Aid Soc'y of Utah, 681 P.2d
199, 203 (Utah 1984).
The Supreme Court initially formulated a
definition of the protected relationship in
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct
2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983), wherein the
Court stated:
When an unwed father demonstrates a
full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by 'comfxng] forward to
participate in the rearing of his child,'
his interest in personal contact with
his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause
But the mere existence of a biological
link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection.
Id. at 261, 103 S.Ct at 2993 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The issue then becomes whether the acts and circumstances
are sufficient to conclude that the father
has "come forward to participate in the
rearing of his child."
We can best understand where Felan fits
in the spectrum of constitutional protection
by analyzing the facts of each relevant
United States Supreme Court case and
comparing them with those presented here.
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98
S.Ct 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978), took place
in Georgia. At the time, Georgia, like
Utah, had a statute which allowed an
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unwed father to legitimate his child. Unlike Felan, the father in Quilloin had failed
to comply with Georgia's statutory requirements to legitimate his ek en-year-old
child prior to the stepfather r.iing a petition for adoption. The chiiu had been in
the mother's complete control for her entire life. The child's natural parents never
lived together with the child. The natural
father never had the child stay with him
and never assumed any significant responsibility in rearing the child. The natural
father never sought custody or visitation
but merely wished to block the stepfather's
petition for adoption and thus the legal
formation of an already physically existing
family unit The Court emphasized the
fact that any relationship between the natural father and child was tenuous, especially when weighed against the countervailing interests of the existing family unit
On these facts, the 'Court concluded the
natural father did not have a "substantial
relationship" with the child and allowed the
natural father's parental rights to be terminated using a "best interests" standard.
In Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
99 S.Ct 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979), the
mother of children bora out of wedlock and
her present husband sought to adopt the
children. The children's natural father objected to the petition for adoption and counter petitioned for adoption. The Supreme
Court held that the New York Domestic
Relations Act's gender-based classification
violated the equal protection clause where
an unwed mother, but not an unwed father,
was permitted to block the adoption of her
child by withholding consent The Court
distinguished those cases where there was
a "substantial parental relationship" and
those cases where there was a mere biological relationship.
The New York Court of Appeals in In re
Malpica-Orsini, supra, [36 N.Y.2d 568,
370 N.Y.S.2d 511, 331 N.E.2d 486
(1975) ], suggested that the requiring of
unmarried fathers' consent for adoption
would pose a strong impediment for
adoption because often it is impossible to
locate unwed fathers when adoption proceedings are brought, whereas mothers
are more likely to remain with their chil-

dren. Even if the special difficulties attendant upon locating and identifying
unwed fathers at birth would justify a
legislative distinction between mothers
and fathers of newborns, these difficulties need not persist past infancy.
When the adoption of an older child is
sought, the State's interest in proceeding
with adoption cases can be protected by
means that do not draw such an inflexible gender-based distinction as that made
in [New York's statute]. In those cases
where the father never has come forward to participate in the rearing of his
child, nothing in the Equal Protection
Clause precludes the State from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing
the adoption of that child
But in
cases such as this, where the father has
established a substantial relationship
with the child and had admitted his
paternity, a State should have no difficulty in identifying the father even of
children born out of wedlock.
IcL at 392-93, 99 S.Ct at 1768-69 (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103
S.Ct 2985, 77 LEd.2d 614 (1983), the putative father never supported and indeed had
rarely seen his two-year-old child before
the adoption. The father never lived with
the child. The mother married eight
months after the child's birth. Her new
husband sought to adopt the child. The
Court emphasized that the liberal New
York acknowledgment statute provided an
unwed father several means to establish
his parenthood: the father could file with
the state registry; the father could be identified on the child's birth certificate; or the
father could live openly with the child and
hold himself out as the child's father. The
father claimed that under the due process
and the equal protection clauses he was
absolutely entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the child could be
adopted. The Supreme Court disagreed,
ruling that because the putative father
failed to comply with the acknowledgment
statute and had not established a "substantial relationship" with the child, the failure
to give him notice of the pending adoption
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have a relationship with the child and to be
a fit and proper parent In 1er to constitutionally terminate Felan s ^ ental rights
and allow the petitioners to proceed with
their plans to adopt the child, the trial
court would have had to determine Felan
was unfit, or that he had abandoned, or
that he substantially neglected his child. It
did not As previously pointed out the
trial court's result is not only at odds with
Utah's statutory scheme applying to unwed
fathers, but also unconstitutional, as Felan
had established a "substantial relationship"
with the child which merits constitutional
protection.
We concede that stability in child placement should be a paramount value. However, "it cannot be the sole yardstick by
which the legality of a particular custodial
arrangement is judged. Such a standard
would reward those who obtain custody,
whether lawfully or otherwise, and maintain it during any ensuing (and protracted)
litigation." In re Adoption of Halloway,
732 P.2d 962, 971-72 (Utah 1986).
IV.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the legal question presented to this court concerns the proper interpretation of the statutory scheme applying
to putative fathers with respect to the termination of their parental rights. We do
not find the acknowledgment and paternity
statutes inconsistent but rather believe
they operate independently in appropriate
factual contexts. We interpret the statutes
as follows: when the unwed father acknowledges his child, within the meaning
5. Even if the acknowledgment statute is construed as requiring the natural father, in addition to those requirements expressly delineated,
to file a notice of paternity m order to legitimate his child, then it was "impossible" for
Felan to file the notice of paternity under the
facts presented See In re Adoption of Baby Boy
Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 689 (Utah 1986), In re of
K.B.E <* T.M.E, 740 ?2d 292, 297 (Utah Ct
App.1987). Felan was led to believe there was
no reason to protect his parental rights by filing
a notice of paternity. On the contrary, everyone concerned, i.e., the petitioners and the
child's mother, knew of his interest in the child.
Indeed, according to Felan, the child's mother
represented that he would get custody of the

of the acknowledgment statute, prior to the
mother's relinquishment of the child or prior to the filing of the petition for adoption,
then the father need not comply with the
requirements of the paternity statute.
However, if the claimed acts of acknowledgment occur after the mother's relinquishment or after the petition for adoption
has been filed, then the paternity statute
governs,6 Where a parent has fulfilled parental obligations over a period of time,
then the parent's parental rights are entitled to a high degree of protection. Wells,
681 P.2d at 203. There is no public policy
favoring the termination of an unwed father's parental rights where the father has
had a long-standing relationship with the
child, is determined to be a fit parent, and
where those seeking to adopt the child are
strangers who have been deceptive in their
adoption plans. By contrast, where the
child is a newborn different policy considerations come into play. Utah's paternity
statute applies to newborns who, by virtue
of their age, cannot possibly have any relationship or attachment to their fathers Id
In addition, there is a strong public policy
favoring adoption of newborns.
Despite the foregoing discussion, we
agree with the tnal court that it may not
be in the child's best interest to award
Felan the right to rear the child. We have
no doubt that the petitioners are and would
continue to be appropriate parents. However, as we have noted, this case does not
turn on what is in the child's "best interest" Parents have a constitutional right
to rear their children. We could agree with
the result reached by the tnal court if it
child upon her death knowing Felan intended to
rear the child The petitioners never told Felan
of their desire to adopt the child until after the
petition for adoption was filed and after the
mother's death Under the circumstances of
this case, as in Baby Boy Doe, this was not
"either a usual case or [one] that notice may be
implied." Baby Boy Doe, 717 ?2d at 691.
Therefore, Felan "has successful!} shown 'that
the termination of his parental rights was contrary to basic notions of due process, that he
came forward within a reasonable time after the
baby's birth, [such that] he should be deemed to
have complied with the statute.'" Id. (quoting
Ellis, 615 ?2d at 1256).
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proceedings did not deny him due process
or equal protection. The Court reasoned
that the putative father could have guaranteed himself notice of the adoption proceedings by complying with the provisions of
the acknowledgment statute. Id. at 26566, 103 S.Ct at 2995-96. The Court found
that the acknowledgment statute adequately protected the putative father's inchoate
interest in establishing a relationship with
his child and, thus, found no merit to his
claim that his constitutional rights were
offended. Id. at 265, 103 S.Ct at 2995.
Applying the foregoing authority to this
case compels the conclusion that Felan has
developed a "substantial relationship" with
his child which merits constitutional protection. The facts in Quilloin are clearly
distinguishable from those in this case.
Here, Felan did not sit on his rights for
eleven years of his child's life. Rather, he
complied with the requirements of Utah's
acknowledgment statute by publicly acknowledging the child and holding the child
out as his own from the child's birth. He
was identified as the child's father on the
child's birth certificate and baptismal
record. He and the child's mother established a home together after the child's
birth. He continued to visit the child even
after the parties' separation and he contributed to the support of the child. Unlike
the natural father in Quilloin, he seeks
actual and legal custody of his child.
The facts of Caban are more similar to
those presented here. In this case, Felan,
like the father in Caban, was identified on
his child's birth certificate, the child is older, the natural parents and the child previously lived together, and Felan stayed in
contact with the child despite Felan's separation from the child's mother. Indeed, the
facts presented here are even more compelling than those in Caban because Caban
involved an adoption by the stepparents;
here, the adoption involves third parties
unrelated in any manner to either Felan or
the child.
4. If "regular support* is a requirement that must
be demonstrated in order to establish that a
father has parental rights, then many divorced
fathers who are not current in their support

Finally, in comparing Lehr, unlike the
putative father there, Felan would have
qualified under the acknowledgment statute because Felan was named on the child's
birth certificate, Felan lived openly with
the child's mother, and Felan held himself
out as the child's father.
Furthermore, although the cases discuss
whether the father contributed to the support of the child, there is no articulated
requirement that the father "regularly support" the child.4
The facts in the record and the findings
of the trial court based on those facts clearly indicate Felan established the requisite
"substantial relationship" with his child prior to the filing of the petition for adoption.
Because Felan had a "substantial relationship" with the child, the termination of his
parental rights by application of the paternity statute or by a utilization of the "best
interests" standard would violate his due
process liberties.
[5] Parental rights cannot be terminated by merely applying the "best interests"
of the child standard but, rather, there
must be a showing of the parent's unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect
In re J.R, 648 P.2d at 1375.
[T]he right of a parent not to be deprived
of parental rights without such a showing is so fundamental to our society and
so basic to our constitutional order . . .
that it ranks among those rights referred
to in Article I, § 25 of the Utah Constitution and the Ninth Amendment of the
United States Constitution as being retained by the people.
This recognition of due process and
retained rights of parents promotes values essential to the preservation of human freedom and dignity and to the perpetuation of our democratic society.
Id. at 1375-76.
[6] In this case, the trial court deprived
Felan of his parental rights based upon the
"best interests" of the child, despite the
fact that the trial court found Felan to
obligations could be subject to having their parental rights terminated under a "best interest"
of the child standard.

had determined that Felan had acknowledged the child but that he was not a fit
and proper parent but had neglected or
subsequently abandoned the child. Under
these circumstances, the termination of
Felan's parental rights would not be unconstitutional.
We, therefore, reverse and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.*
We concede such a result may disrupt the
child's stability. However, as previously
discussed, the child's stability must be considered in relationship to the constitutional
rights of Felan.
GARFF and DAVIDSON, JJ., concur.

In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF
INFANT ANONYMOUS.
No. 870415-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Sept 1, 1988.
Prospective adoptive parents appealed
from order of Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Richard H. Moffat, J., allowing natural mother of infant to revoke her
consent to adoption and ordering custody
of infant returned to natural mother. The
Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that
evidence was insufficient to establish any
permissible ground for withdrawal of consent
Judgment vacated.
1. Adoption <3»15
Appellate court's review of decision allowing natural mother to revoke her consent to adoption was de novo; where trial
6. We point out that this was an adoption proceeding governed by Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-304, -5 (1987), and not an action for custody. See

court's decision was rendered solely on basis of documentary evidence.
2. Adoption «»7.8(1)
Adoption consent of natural parent
given before district judge gives rise to
presumption of regularity that can be overcome only by showing of duress, undue
influence, misrepresentation, deception, or
other grounds justifying release from any
contract U.C.A.1953, 78-30-8.
3. Adoption <s=>7.8(l)
Natural mother's claim that she believed she had six-month period in which to
revoke her consent to adoption did not
show misrepresentation as required to
overcome presumption of regularity of consent executed before and accepted by a
judge. U.C.A.1953, 78-30-8.
4. Appeal and Error «=»837(1)
Counsel's comments and characterizations of the "facts" at oral argument on
motion were not evidence properly considered by appellate court
5. Adoption <s=>7.8(3)
In motion to set aside adoption consent
based on misunderstanding, weight of evidence would have supported validity of
adoption consent even if natural mother
had asserted that she was misled by trial
judge's isolated comment concerning finality of adoption proceedings. U.C.A.1953, 7830-8.
6. Adoption <s»7.5
Status of adoption consent as knowing
and voluntary was not effected by the fact
that adult natural mother chose not to consult with members of her own family concerning adoption until after execution of
consent U.C.A.1953, 78-30-8.
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